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1foreword
The 1990s brought us the Rio Convention 
and a global recognition of our dependence 
on ecosystems, both managed and natural, to 
ensure our own livelihoods and future. As easy 
as it may be to think that we live in a digital world 
ruled by smart phones and iPads, the truth is 
that we live on a biological planet. We depend 
on its biology not only for the food we eat, the 
water we drink, and the air we breathe, but also 
for many other aspects of our health and cultural 
identity. Biodiversity is the Earth’s operating 
system. Like our computers’ operating systems, 
which allow us to run programmes and perform 
operations, the global operating system provides 
us with critical services and operations that are 
the result of species’ interactions over millennia. 
The increasing human footprint on this operating 
system threatens the very source of our wellbeing. 
The year 2012 – 20 years after Rio – was an 
opportunity to look back and take stock of the 
progress we have made. Unfortunately, the 
2010 biodiversity targets of the Convention 
on Biological Diversity were not met, and 
biodiversity continues to be threatened globally. 
On the positive side, the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services 
(IPBES) was born in April 2012, just in time 
for the annual ‘Earth Day’ celebration of the 
global environmental movement. The IPBES, 
sister to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC), will bring about greater global 
collaboration on biodiversity and ecosystem 
conservation. The second major development of 
the past 20 years is that connections between 
biodiversity conservation and development 
goals are now clear and commonly understood. 
We recognise that we cannot talk about 
biodiversity conservation without discussing 
poverty alleviation; and that we cannot discuss 
food security without taking into account 
agriculture’s footprint on the environment. Or, 
even more fundamentally, that agriculture is 
wholly dependent on biodiversity in order to 
be sustainable. We also recognise that food 
production can no longer be the sole objective 
of human-dominated landscapes; rather, these 
landscapes must be managed for multiple 
objectives and services including (but not limited 
to) capturing and storing atmospheric carbon 
dioxide, water quality and quantity, scenic values, 
and biodiversity conservation. 
In 1996, the tiny country of Costa Rica took 
bold steps to initiate one of the first nationalised 
‘payments for ecosystem services’ (PES) 
programmes. The programme has grown 
tremendously, as the first chapter of this paper 
will show. It has been the envy of many – as 
well as the target of often undue criticism, as 
is frequently the case for pioneers. This paper 
serves to highlight the difficulties in managing 
a national, multi-objective programme. The 
authors beautifully illustrate the experiences of 
the National Forestry Fund (FONAFIFO) and 
Costa Rica’s PES programme by discussing its 
history, its contributions to conservation, and the 
hurdles it has met. They also provide clear and 
concise recommendations of how the programme 
could be improved to balance conservation 
goals, development goals, and the provision 
of ecosystem services. The authors discuss 
critical questions of fairness, and the need for 
programmes that are subsidised by the federal 
government to provide tangible social benefits, 
including access by the rural poor. 
Crucially, this report also considers how the 
programme can be improved in terms of managing 
the multiple ‘trade-offs’ – such as between social 
and environmental objectives – and proposes 
‘policymixes’ that combine ecological, economic, 
and sociological information in targeting 
PES to increase its effectiveness at meeting 
multiple goals. The examples given serve to not 
only provide some guidance to Costa Rica in 
particular, but also offer invaluable insights into 
how far PES has come as a concept which is 
applicable internationally. They show how we can 
use lessons learnt from the past to map the use 
of financial tools to promote conservation and 
provision of ecosystem services in the future.
Dr Fabrice DeClerck, Bioversity International 
2Costa Rica’s Payments for Ecosystems Services 
(PES) programme has become something of an 
icon in the world of conservation. Its innovative 
blend of economic and regulatory instruments 
– and its hitches and successes – provide a 
valuable source of inspiration for other countries 
that are looking for effective ways to conserve 
and regenerate ecosystems. Since 1997, nearly 
one million hectares of forest in Costa Rica have 
been part of the PES programme at one time or 
another, and forest cover has now returned to over 
50 per cent of the country’s land area, from a low 
of just 20 per cent in the 1980s. What lessons 
can be learnt from the 20 years since it was 
founded? Also published in Spanish, this paper 
is for local practitioners, international researchers 
and donors who are interested in the Costa 
Rican experience.
Since 1997 the programme has helped 
to conserve nearly one million hectares of 
forest by payments for protection (90 per 
cent), reforestation (6 per cent), sustainable 
management (3 per cent) and more recently 
regeneration (1 per cent). Initially, PES contracts 
were granted on a first-come, first-served basis, 
and payments ended up going to areas with 
low risk of deforestation. More recently, priority 
access has been given to areas which are 
more critical to conservation. A national-level 
conservation strategy, GRUAS II, is expected 
to complete this process of environmental 
targeting. The programme is structured around 
four ecosystem services: capturing and storing 
atmospheric carbon, protecting water sources, 
and conserving biodiversity and scenic beauty. 
However there is little to no evidence that 
these services (with the potential exception of 
carbon) have increased due to the effects of the 
programme: most efforts to quantify are limited 
to monitoring actions expected to lead to better 
ecosystem services; and obtaining evidence of 
actual impact on these services is potentially very 
expensive. On the other hand, its lack is not a 
particular limitation of the Costa Rican PES. Most 
environmental programmes around the world 
focus on relatively easy-to-measure indicators, like 
hectares of land, rather than assessing one type 
of ecosystem service.
The PES programme benefits people directly, 
through direct payments and potentially new jobs, 
and indirectly, for instance by promoting healthier 
ecosystems. Better provision of ecosystem 
services are essential to improving resilience 
to climate change, as well as being inputs to 
agriculture, generation of hydroelectricity, and 
the ecotourism industry. Until now, there have 
been few efforts to account for all impacts on 
people beyond the direct financial benefits of 
those participating directly. Participation in the 
programme has increased for both indigenous 
communities (from 3 to 26 per cent of budget 
allocation between 1997 and 2012) and female-
headed properties (from 16 to 23 per cent in the 
same period). It appears that PES has also helped 
to gradually regularise property ownership among 
smaller landowners, and encouraged compliance 
with farm employees’ social security obligations. A 
critique of the PES programme has been its bias 
towards larger properties. However, the recent 
introduction of agroforestry contracts has been a 
successful way to engage with smaller properties, 
whose participation has significantly increased. 
On the other hand it has become clear that using 
the Social Development Index (SDI) as a criterion 
to give priority access to low-income areas has 
not been effective; in fact this gives indiscriminate 
priority to relatively well-off landowners in 
these areas.
summary
3As the PES scheme enters a more mature phase 
it can no longer afford to ‘learn by doing’. There 
are four main areas in which it can improve its 
current approach:
•	 Use simple indicators for environmental impact. 
Rather than spending its budget on monitoring 
separate impacts – such as the amount of 
carbon captured – the programme should 
continue to use land as a unit for ‘bundled’ 
ecosystem services; a healthy ecosystem is 
more likely to deliver these services. The current 
holistic landscape-based approach should be 
more effective, targeting geographical areas on 
the basis of their vulnerability and significance. 
Efforts should be directed to ensuring these 
areas are effectively engaged in the programme. 
•	 Target a specific social group. The current 
practice of targeting areas with a low social 
development indicator is not effective for 
prioritising access for the poor. A better 
indicator to assign social priority, and 
measure the programme’s equity of access, 
could combine:
 – properties belonging to individuals (rather 
than legal entities)
 – areas with a low Social Development Index 
 – small properties (less than 50 hectares).
•	 Consider approaches to increase cost-
effectiveness. Payment levels should be better 
tuned to local costs – especially ‘opportunity 
costs’ – to avoid the current over-payments for 
some and rejected applications for others. To do 
this the programme needs more understanding 
of the economic context, local regulations 
regarding land use, the profitability of alternative 
land uses, and their capacity to provide the 
necessary ecosystem services. A mix of 
instruments may be necessary to achieve the 
potentially conflicting objectives of efficiency 
and fairness.
•	 Define an impact evaluation tool for continuous 
monitoring. This is essential to avoid duplication 
in data collection. An information system could 
link information from the different steps of 
the pre-application and application process 
to awarded contracts, payment information, 
monitoring data, and contract renewal 
information. This integration of databases 
can then be taken advantage of for periodic 
strategic programme evaluation.
•	 Proposals for increased effectiveness through 
spatial and social targeting of PES must be 
balanced against institutional set-up and 
transaction costs. We suggest that a natural 
scepticism to PES allocation schemes that 
increase management costs has been a 
consistent feature of PES under FONAFIFO 
management. When changes have been 
made, such as with new criteria and points-
based scoring of applications, they have been 
tested incrementally.
4additionaLity Environmental additionality is the change in land use generated by 
the PES payment, which can be compared with what would have 
happened if no scheme were in place – see ‘counterfactual’ below.
cadastre Costa Rica’s official register of land property records.
cohort In statistics, a group of subjects who have shared a particular event 
together during a particular time span (for instance landowners who 
accessed PES between 1997 and 2005).
conservation gaPs 
(vacíos de 
conservación)
The areas identified as a priority for conservation efforts in Costa 
Rica not adequately represented in the present network of protected 
areas (PAs) and PES. 
contract 
comPLiance
The degree to which recipients of PES comply with the terms 
agreed in the contracts. Monitoring usually includes farm visits and/
or satellite imagery.
cost-effectiveness The unit cost of producing a well-defined objective, such as the total 
cost of protecting one hectare of forest (including ‘opportunity cost’ 
– see below). It is a useful concept when deciding how to achieve an 
agreed outcome at the lowest cost. 
counterfactuaL A study of what would have happened in the absence of the 
programme or policy, in order to measure ‘additionality’ (see above).
ecosystem services The PES scheme recognises four main services that ecosystems 
provide to people:
1. Carbon sequestration: the capture and long-term storage of 
atmospheric carbon dioxide, a greenhouse gas 
2. Hydrological services: protecting watersheds or ‘recharge’ areas,
3. Biodiversity conservation: protecting a wide variety of coexisting 
plant and animal species 
4. Preservation of scenic beauty.
efficiency Refers to the benefit-cost ratio, in this case of a conservation 
decision, when all ‘externalities’, including ecosystem services 
benefits and transaction costs have been considered (strictly 
speaking, valued monetarily). 
gLossary of Pes terms
5Justice 
(ParticiPatory, 
distributive/ 
fairness/ Legitimacy) 
A focus on justice in conservation looks beyond impacts on 
wellbeing, into how outcomes are reached (procedural justice in the 
process of design and implementation of the PES programme), and 
on how the benefits and costs of these outcomes are distributed 
among different stakeholders (distributive justice). Fairness, or 
sense of justice, is how the people affected perceive and judge 
the process and outcomes (Svarstad et al., 2011; Grieg-Gran et 
al., 2013).
environmentaL 
effectiveness
The degree to which a policy achieves specific environmental goals, 
without taking costs into account. It can be expressed in terms 
of impact on the ecosystem service (e.g. tonnes of carbon) or in 
terms of actions expected to generate an outcome (e.g. hectares of 
protected forest).
imPact evaLuation (ie) Monitors whether the programme is effective in promoting the 
protection of ecosystem services (or an indicator such as forest 
cover). IE methodologies take into account selection bias (the 
statistical error that arises in choosing the individuals or groups 
to take part in the evaluation), and establish methods to clarify 
attribution of the PES. The best way to evaluate is a random 
selection of farms participating in the PES compared with randomly 
selected farms that do not participate in the scheme. ‘Matching’ 
is used to improve the accuracy of the evaluation, which takes into 
account the characteristics of the area, farm or household that 
influences the probability of participation in the PES scheme. The 
‘before-after: control-intervention’ method is used to understand 
the link between cause and effect. Here evaluators use baseline 
data for a control group (farms without PES) and an intervention 
group (farms with PES), and evaluation is done before the 
intervention (i.e. payments are made) and evaluated at a later date, 
using econometric techniques to isolate the specific effect of PES 
on a determined variable (e.g. conservation). These two groups 
can also be used to measure how other economic and/or social 
characteristics affect conservation, for example by isolating the 
effect of legal status (indigenous group, companies), or economic 
group (small producer, landowner) on conservation.
inPut-based, outPut-
based
Input-based schemes work on the assumption that a given 
land-based activity, such as protecting forest cover, will deliver 
ecosystem services. Output-based schemes try to measure the 
actual ecosystem services provided, such as tons of carbon 
captured or quality of water. 
LandscaPe aPProach A holistic approach to conservation, looking at local economies 
and agriculture, eco-tourism and other benefits of the environment 
beyond biodiversity alone. 
Leakage, 
neighbourhood 
effects
‘Leakage’ refers to the displacement of environmentally damaging 
land uses; for instance the farmer agrees to protect the forest under 
contract but deforests another part of his farm. ‘Neighbourhood 
effects’ may be positive or negative links between a farm’s land-use 
and land-use on a neighbouring property.
6LegaL entities  
(and sociedades 
anónimas (s.a.))
Some PES contracts are signed with legal entities (personas 
jurídicas) established through a registration process, with legal 
rights and liabilities that are distinct from their employees and/or 
shareholders. Many of these are sociedades anónimas – which 
directly translated means ‘anonymous society’ – designating a type 
of corporation in countries that mostly employ civil law. It is roughly 
equivalent to public limited company in common law jurisdictions 
and is different from partnerships and private limited companies. 
oPPortunity costs The income or benefits foregone by a landowner when choosing 
to participate in PES, such as revenue from growing crops. It is the 
difference in income between the most profitable land use (before 
PES) and forest conservation. 
PoLicymix A combination of policy instruments, which has evolved to influence 
the quantity and quality of biodiversity conservation and ecosystem 
service provision in public and private sectors. 
Protected areas (Pa) Legally protected (to various degrees), government owned/
managed areas of importance for flora and fauna in Costa Rica. 
Includes national parks, biological reserves, forest reserves, 
protected zones, wildlife refuges and biological corridors. 
redd, redd+ REDD-type projects refer to performance-based payments or 
incentives to developing countries that result in Reduced Emissions 
from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD). Projects that 
also enhance forest carbon stores through forest conservation and 
reforestation are known as REDD+. 
sPatiaL or 
environmentaL 
targeting 
Spatial targeting means prioritising areas for PES deemed 
important for conservation. This goes beyond voluntary 
participation, when landowners self-select for the scheme. Spatial 
targeting can be achieved in different ways; either by directly 
engaging with landowners on the site on a one-to-one basis, or 
by providing tailored-made incentives like priority access and/or 
differentiated payments.
7Costa Rica’s PES programme is one of the best 
known examples of its kind. It was conceived 
during the early 1990s as an experimental 
instrument to help reverse the country’s rapid 
deforestation. After significant consultation with 
key stakeholders, the programme was created in 
1996, along with the initial governance structure 
allocating responsibilities and funding. The 
programme became operational in 1997. The 
way the programme is implemented has changed 
since then, adapting to changes in Costa Rica’s 
economy, new technologies and the expectations 
that have grown with the programme’s 
higher profile.
The PES programme has become something of 
an icon in the world of payments for ecosystem 
services, with other countries looking to learn 
from it, especially as water markets and schemes 
to reward forest conservation and reduced 
deforestation become more popular (such as 
REDD – see glossary). Within Costa Rica too, 
there is a need to reflect on how the contexts 
and challenges facing PES have changed; 
and to use this reflection to continue building a 
robust programme.
In this report we explore how the governance 
of the PES programme has evolved over time 
and how it is prepared to face future challenges. 
Based on previous and ongoing research, 
discussions with local stakeholders and the 
authors’ long-term experience in the Costa Rican 
PES, we propose ways by which the programme’s 
approach can be strengthened to provide a 
balance of ecosystem and social benefits. Also 
published in Spanish, this report is aimed at 
local practitioners, international researchers and 
donors interested in the Costa Rican experience 
and the lessons that emerge from it.
We first review how the PES programme has 
evolved through time, as part of a series of 
experimental instruments trying to tackle the 
high deforestation rates in the country; and how 
it has adapted through time to respond to new 
challenges (Section 2). Next we look at the 
components that together make the programme: 
its rules, roles, and rewards (Section 3). Then 
we focus our attention on the programme’s 
impacts: on the ecosystem services it is meant 
to provide (Section 4); on the people affected 
directly and indirectly (Section 5); and on how 
balancing these two issues affect the PES’s 
value for money (Section 6). Our conclusions and 
recommendations are presented in Section 7. 
ONE
introduction
8Costa Rica’s PES programme did not emerge 
fully formed. It was part of a process seeking to 
address conservation (or the lack of it) in Costa 
Rica’s private lands. This section presents a 
brief discussion of the processes leading to the 
emergence of the PES programme, including the 
context and policies affecting forest conservation 
(see Figure 1).
2.1 buiLding uP to Pes 
Forest cover in Costa Rica has undergone 
dramatic changes, with a fast declining trajectory 
until the mid 1980s (Sánchez-Azofeifa et 
al., 2007). From covering 70 per cent of the 
country in 1950, forests declined to just 20 
per cent by 1987. This was one of the fastest 
deforestation rates in Latin America. At the end 
of the 1980s however, forests began to recover 
and reforestation and afforestation have shown a 
steady upward trend – recently flattening out at 
around 52 per cent of the country’s land area.
These massive transformations in the landscape 
result from a combination of policies affecting land 
use, as well as international market and political 
pressure. The early period of deforestation saw 
forest rapidly converted into agricultural and cattle 
ranching areas, which benefited from generous 
land titling and cheap bank loans as part of the 
Government’s efforts to colonise new land. High 
international prices for beef and other expansive 
crops such as coffee and bananas exacerbated 
these policies’ effects on deforestation. The 
trend was only stopped by new pressures which 
emerged in the 1980s. Political and economic 
instability created by the wars in Central America, 
and the collapse in global meat, sugar and coffee 
markets, lead to abandonment of a significant 
proportion of agricultural land. At the same 
time, early voices of an emerging conservation 
movement began to call for change. The creation 
of several national parks across the country was 
an important first step. 
The early 1990s saw the strengthening of a re-
greening process,1 although it was impossible 
to know at the time whether the reversal in the 
deforestation trend was permanent or temporary. 
Outdated and ineffective laws and policies had 
to change. For example, at the time forests were 
a liability, open to expropriation and squatters 
rather than to viable economic activities. 
Reforestation incentives were considered a risky 
business; in many cases people deforested 
areas in order to make lands eligible for 
reforestation incentives later. Although a wide 
variety of incentives were implemented, they 
had limited success in stopping deforestation 
and encouraging reforestation (Watson et al., 
1998). Nonetheless, those early incentives 
partially paved the way for the creation of the 
PES programme.
The PES programme was introduced by the new 
Forestry Law 7575 in 1996, following wide-
reaching consultation with multiple stakeholders 
(Le Coq et al., 2010; Watson et al., 1998). 
This law formed the foundation for two main 
instruments. First, it banned all conversion 
of established forests punishable by prison 
sentences rather than fines, effectively lowering 
the ‘opportunity cost’ of converting existing 
forests (see Section 6.2 for a discussion of 
opportunity cost). Second, it introduced the offer 
of payments for reforesting, protecting forest, 
TWO
the evoLution of  
Pes in costa rica
1. The first national park was created in the 1950s, but it was the 1980s that saw the expansion and consolidation of 
the National Parks and PA system.
9or managing existing forest in private properties 
outside national parks: the PES programme 
was born.
The PES approach has been widely criticised 
and debated. Given the ban on deforestation, 
some consider the PES either ‘redundant’, or 
that it ‘overlaps’ the ban; others, a ‘rebranding’ 
of previous subsidies (Matulis, 2012); or a 
necessary incentive for keeping forests standing, 
given low capacity for enforcement (Barton et al., 
2013); and a quid pro quo or pre-condition for 
popular acceptability of the ban (Pagiola, 2008; 
Daniels et al., 2010; Pfaff et al., 2008; Sánchez-
Azofeifa et al., 2007). The Forestry Law also 
provided the institutional framework required to 
implement the PES, as well as the initial funds 
to kick-start the process (see Section 3 for a 
description of the programme). 
The programme has had concrete positive 
impacts since its inception. Between 1997 
and 2012, it has protected more than 860,000 
hectares of forest, reforested 60,000 hectares 
and supported sustainable forest management 
in almost 30,000 hectares. More recently, 
it promoted natural regeneration of almost 
10,000 hectares. This totals nearly one million 
hectares under the PES scheme at one time 
or another, as well as 4.4 million trees2 planted 
2. Agroforestry contracts are reported in terms of trees per contract, rather than hectares.
figure 1. changes in forest cover in costa rica in reLation to context, 
economic and reguLatory instruments 
Source: Authors’ own, based on Watson et al. (1998), Kleinn et al. (2002) and Daniels et al. (2010)
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under agroforestry systems since 2003. This is a 
substantial achievement for a developing country 
of just 51,100km2. By 2010, roughly 52 per cent of 
the territory was under some sort of forest cover: 
a great victory for the environmental movement, 
especially considering the 1983 low of 21 per 
cent (Kleinn et al., 2002).
Looking forward, the programme managers 
expect to increase its environmental effectiveness 
by defining and using ‘priority criteria’ for 
allocating payments, targeting the areas that 
most need protection and/or regeneration. The 
socio-economic benefits of the programme are 
also important, especially where the PES is the 
main permanent source of cash, for example in 
indigenous communities and remote rural areas 
(see Section 5). As the programme matures, 
a clearer approach to overall governance 
emerges, with more focused efforts to reduce 
transaction costs, the creation of local offices 
in areas of high risk of deforestation, a clearer 
institutional structure that promotes inter-sectorial 
cooperation (for example, between government 
ministries), legal and technical capacity building 
for programme managers, and simplified 
contracts with clear guidelines. The administrative 
flexibility of the programme has been key to 
the development of monitoring, evaluation and 
feedback systems that facilitate continuous 
innovation and adaptation. 
2.2 Long-term obJectives and 
chaLLenges
One of the main challenges is to align PES with 
the overall conservation policy in Costa Rica. Until 
now, PES has been used as the main instrument 
to target private landowners, and complements 
the public system of Wildlife Protected Areas 
(WPA) – also referred as Protected Areas (PAs) 
which includes National Parks – covering 26 per 
cent of the country’s total land area. 
But the focus of conservation efforts is now 
shifting from quantity to quality, and the need 
to specifically look into pressures, priorities 
and species not adequately represented in the 
present network of PAs and PES. These are 
known as ‘conservation gaps’, or vacíos de 
conservación in Spanish (SINAC and MINAE, 
2007). A recent study and consultation process 
(known as GRUAS II) suggests that in order to 
address these conservation gaps, the country 
needs a ‘landscape’ approach to conservation: 
a holistic approach, looking at local economies 
and agriculture, eco-tourism and other benefits 
of the environment beyond biodiversity alone. It 
also calls for a mix of instruments that includes 
a) enforcing current legal restrictions (for 
example development planning and prohibitions); 
b) administrative mechanisms like changes in 
categories of PAs and/or biological corridors and 
c) expansion of voluntary approaches like PES 
and Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
Degradation (REDD) (Sáenz-Faerrón et al., 2010; 
Rodríquez and Obando, 2012).
Within the wider strategy addressing conservation 
gaps, the PES programme has established two 
concrete environmental objectives: 
1. Protect existing forests: eliminate ‘conservation 
gaps’ (forests with no protection status at risk 
of change) in about 14 per cent of the country, 
increasing protection of existing forests in 
private lands to reach a target of 256,000 
hectares by 2030, and promoting connectivity 
between forests through biological corridors to 
facilitate the movements of flora and fauna.
two
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2. Regenerate degraded areas and secondary 
forests: to begin regenerating forest in 
8500 hectares of degraded areas through 
agroforestry systems; and support 20,000 
hectares of ‘secondary’ forests (re-grown 
after deforestation).
But in order to achieve these objectives, the 
programme needs to address several issues. 
First, a clear understanding is needed of how the 
programme operates within a wider mix of policies 
affecting conservation (Section 3). As a matter 
of urgency, it needs to look at how effective it is 
in terms of achieving its environmental objectives 
– beyond simple indicators like ‘hectares under 
contracts’ (see Section 4). It also needs to 
find, and demonstrate, a balance between 
ecosystem and social co-benefits, such that it 
meets policy obligations/social contracts (like 
improving wellbeing in rural areas) and complies 
with legal restrictions on the use of public funds 
and requirements to support small and medium 
farmers3 (Section 5). Increasing environmental 
effectiveness will need a clearer understanding 
of context (see Section 6). Programme managers 
need a clearer understanding of the ‘opportunity 
costs’ of forest activities – the revenue and 
benefits which the landowner foregoes by 
choosing to sign up to PES. This requires an 
understanding of profits from forest activities, 
regulations regarding land use, and the drivers 
of changes in land use. Better targeting (see 
glossary) can help improve cost-effectiveness 
and reduce the budget required to meet the 
programme’s objectives, which is currently 
estimated at US$35 million per year (Sáenz-
Fearron et al., 2010) – about twice as much as the 
current budget allocated to PES. 
Because the PES programme depends heavily on 
state funds, it has to both ensure environmental 
effectiveness and cultivate the necessary political 
support to receive financing. For example, it 
needs to respond to requests from institutions 
governing disbursement and the transparency 
of public funds on such questions as the use 
of possession rights versus formal property 
rights (see the recent audit in Contraloría de la 
República4, 2011). Communication channels also 
need to be widened to include other institutions 
whose policies directly or indirectly influence 
the provision of ecosystem services (such as 
the agricultural and urban sectors), and those 
institutions and groups which may help to improve 
the cost-effectiveness of the programme and its 
evaluation and monitoring.
Other challenges include managing trade-offs, 
which are unavoidable: for example, attempts at 
using better indicators for ecosystem services 
are likely to result in more expensive monitoring 
systems. PES programme managers need to 
keep the purpose of the programme in mind at 
all times – the provision of ecosystem services 
and strengthening of small- and medium-sized 
landowners – and be ready to evaluate whether 
the PES programme is always the best instrument 
for the purpose. 
3. Article 46, Law 7575, on the objectives for the creation of FONAFIFO actually refers to small and medium 
‘producers’, a term which is not further explained. In theory at least, it probably refers to landowners whose livelihoods 
are derived (partly or as a whole) from the forest or forest plantation. 
4. This audit was commissioned by the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) in 
2011. 
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Costa Rica’s PES programme acknowledges 
that owners of forests are entitled to apply 
for payments for the vital services that these 
ecosystems provide. A detailed framework 
defines these ecosystem services5, which come 
under four main categories: 
•	 Carbon sequestration: the capture and long-
term storage of atmospheric carbon dioxide.
•	 Water (‘hydrological services’): the protection 
of water catchment areas.
•	 Protection of biodiversity: for conservation and 
sustainable use6.
•	 Scenic beauty.
The programme is a mix of rules, regulations 
and rewards that invite stakeholders to respond 
to incentives and disincentives. The legal 
underpinning establishes the structure by which 
the PES programme secures funding, how it is 
managed, and who is eligible to participate.
The National Forestry Fund (FONAFIFO) is the 
primary intermediary charged with administrating 
the PES programme. It signs legal contracts 
agreeing land use with forest owners, and 
monitors their compliance through local forestry 
technical facilitators (regentes forestales). In 
exchange for the payments, the landowners 
transfer the ‘rights’ to the ecosystem services 
to FONAFIFO, where they make up the wider 
portfolio of approved ecosystem services (ES) 
credits. FONAFIFO then sells some of these 
credits to its buyers. Figure 2 presents the overall 
structure of the programme, which is discussed in 
more detail below. 
3.1 demand for ecosystem 
services: the buyers
The sources of demand, and therefore funding, for 
ecosystem services are:
•	 Government funds, mainly through earmarked 
tax revenues from water and fossil fuels, as 
well as (in lesser amounts) from forestry and 
conservation trusts.
•	 The private sector, through voluntary deals 
with private and semi-public companies 
(such as hydroelectric companies), as well 
as international sales of carbon credits and 
biodiversity-protection credits (which are 
planned for, but not yet available). 
•	 International banks and bilateral agencies 
through loans and agreements.
Government funds. The main funding for PES 
comes from the government and is established by 
law. The initial PES allocation in 1997 came partly 
from former forestry trusts,7 but mostly from an 
earmarked tax on fossil fuels collection. The year 
2006 saw a significant boost to the PES budget 
5. The Forest (7575) and Biodiversity (7788) laws actually use the term ‘environmental services’. While the definition of 
ecosystem services has been the subject of many research papers recently, it is an interesting policy footnote that the 
transition to the term ‘ecosystem services’ in the policy discourse in Costa Rica’s PES has been carried out without any 
changes to legislation. 
6. Biodiversity protection as an objective of PES foreshadowed the Millennium Ecosystem Assessments definition of 
‘supporting services’ as a precondition for other services. Law 7575 links biodiversity protection ‘for sustainable use, 
scientific and pharmaceutical, research, genetic improvement and protection of ecosystems and life forms’.
7. These trusts include (Rodríguez, 2005): Trust 178 (AID), Trust 04-87 (forestry tax), Trust FDF (Holland and 
Sweden), Trust 19-91 (ordinary budget), and FDF-Multidonor (diverse funds).
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when water taxes were increased8 with 25 per 
cent of collections destined for PES in strategic 
water catchment areas. The actual amount 
transferred to PES varies annually, affected both 
by the amount of tax collected and the political will 
influencing how this money is ultimately spent. On 
average, PES revenues from fuel tax are US$11.3 
million per year (Murillo et al., 2011; Ross et al., 
2007), and the accumulated income from the 
water tax between 2007 and the first 6 months of 
2010 was approximately US$3.6 million (Astorga 
Espeleta, 2011). Water tax revenues are expected 
to increase with increasing political pressure from 
interest groups, subsidies and improvements in 
tax collection systems.
Voluntary agreements with local users 
According to Blackman and Woodward (2010), 
less than 3 per cent of the programme area 
is financed by private funds – and of these, 
hydroelectric plants are the principal clients. 
FONAFIFO signed ground-breaking voluntary 
agreements with three hydroelectric companies 
(Energía Global, Platanar, and the CNFL) and the 
beverage company Florida Ice & Farm between 
1997 and 2004. These agreements paved the 
way not only to further deals with the private 
sector – amounting to 80 contracts by 2012 
(Sánchez, 2013) – but also to the government’s 
decision to allocate a percentage of the water tax 
to PES. The basic form of these deals is through 
‘over-the-counter’ transactions. Buyers purchase 
Certificates of Ecosystem Services (CSA, in 
Spanish), and choose the ecosystem service 
they wish to pay for, whether watershed services 
(Agua Viva CSA), biodiversity, landscape beauty 
(Bosque Vivo CSA) or carbon sequestration 
(Viaje Limpio CSA). These tax-deductible, 
over-the-counter transactions are promoted as a 
corporate environmental and social responsibility 
figure 2. the structure of costa rica’s Pes Programme 
Source: authors’ own
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investment, with low transaction costs compared 
to ‘one-to-one’ (e.g. individual) agreements. They 
also offer transparency and convenience, allowing 
the investor their preferred ecosystem service 
and/or geographical area. CSA mostly targets 
the national market, especially hydroelectric 
companies, and the new market niche opened by 
the announcement of the Carbon Neutral Policy. 
The marketing possibilities opened up by CSA 
may be restricted by FONAFIFO’s current internal 
capacity, which will require further specialisation 
to upscale and tap into other sources (Murillo et 
al., 2011).
International sales of ecosystem services 
The first international transaction for ecosystem 
services took place in 1997 with the sale of 
carbon credits to Norway. These were known as 
‘Certified Tradable Offsets’ (CTO) and certificates 
were sold through the Chicago Climate Exchange. 
However, the initially high expectations for carbon 
markets for forest protection were not met. 
Global demand was directed towards energy 
projects in places like India instead of forestry 
and agroforestry; and defining the baselines for 
forest carbon was difficult, although this metrics-
related problem is not limited to forests (Murillo 
et al., 2011). To date the country has targeted 
voluntary carbon markets that generate social and 
ecosystem co-benefits. The average Costa Rican 
price for carbon was roughly US$8 per tonne 
of equivalent carbon dioxide (CO2e) – a price 
considered too high for global carbon markets, 
where average prices were about US$4.6 
per tonne. Global prices looked slightly more 
promising in 2012, with a boost bringing average 
prices to US$9.2 per tonne. Most of these 
prices however correspond to afforestation and 
reforestation, rather than REDD-type transactions 
(e.g. carbon plus co-benefits, which are the 
type that Costa Rica offers, see glossary) which 
actually decreased in volume of participation 
(Peters-Stanley et al., 2012).
International loans, grants and other agreements 
Loans and international agreements were mostly 
used at the beginning to finance the programme. 
The World Bank provided a loan to strengthen the 
PES programme, focusing on forest protection 
(with a strong social issues component) along 
the Mesoamerican biological corridor. The 
project, named Ecomarkets (2000–06),9 was 
co-funded with a US$40 million grant from 
the Global Environmental Facility and national 
government funds for US$9 million. It led to 
another project; Mainstreaming Market-Based 
Instruments for Environmental Management 
(Ecomarkets II, 2006–14)10 aimed at securing 
long-term f inancing for the programme. 
For reforestation, FONAFIFO’s experience 
suggests that a combination of PES and 
affordable credit works best to encourage small- 
and medium-scale farmers to participate. It 
therefore signed an agreement for approximately 
US$12 million with the German Cooperation 
Bank (KfW) for the protection of forests and 
recovery of deforested lands in the northern 
region of Huetar Norte. FONAFIFO also reached 
an agreement with the government of Japan and 
the World Bank to co-fund the REFORESTA 
project11 targeting the promotion of sustainable 
9. See www.worldbank.org/projects/P052009/ecomarkets-project?lang=en.
10. See www.worldbank.org/projects/P093384/mainstreaming-market-based-instruments-environmental-
management-project?lang=en.
11. Reactivación de la Reforestación Comercial en Costa Rica (REFORESTA). 
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forestry amongst small- and medium-scale 
farmers through a combination of PES and 
accessible credit. The Biodiversity Trust Fund is a 
relatively new fund that plans to promote long-term 
PES for forest protection in the Osa Peninsula 
(see Box 1).
3.2 Payment LeveLs 
The PES programme focuses on five uses of 
private land: 1) forest protection, 2) commercial 
reforestation, 3) agroforestry, 4) sustainable 
forest management, and 5) regeneration of 
degraded areas.
These types of land use serve as a proxy for 
providing the four ecosystem services. Sub-
categories target the activities which are expected 
to provide specific ecosystem services, for 
example the protection of water when land is 
located in important ‘hydrological recharge 
areas’ (where water collects to recharge natural 
or man-made reservoirs). Likewise, reforestation 
and agroforestry have subcategories that further 
reward the use of native species, in recognition of 
the additional biodiversity protection services they 
provide (see Table 1 for 2012 levels).
Figure 3 compares purchasing power adjusted 
average annual payment levels for different PES 
subcategories since the start of the programme 
(controlling for varying contract length). Payment 
levels for the ‘protection’ PES have fallen in real 
terms by more than 50 per cent since their high 
in 1998.
With the 2013 presidential decree on PES (no. 
37660) a ‘forest plantations’ pilot scheme was 
launched. It differs from the reforestation PES 
currently in place in that owners will not require 
permits to harvest plantation trees. 
box 1. the biodiversity fund
The Biodiversity Trust Fund (BTF)12 aims to 
solve two of the main PES problems: first, 
the lack of long-term funding for biodiversity 
contracts, and second, the fact that forested 
areas are isolated from one another, restricting 
biodiversity. The BTF plans to secure 
biodiversity contracts of up to 99 years, and 
safeguards forests on continuous stretches of 
forest on private land. An initial phase is taking 
place on the Osa Peninsula on the Southern 
Pacific coast of Costa Rica. ‘Biological 
corridors’ connect at least 70,000 hectares 
of forests in two national parks. The BTF 
combines PES with other financial and legal 
mechanisms to strengthen conservation in the 
Osa Peninsula; these include ‘conservation 
easements’, ‘in-kind payments’ and the 
promotion of ‘added-value’ activities. The 
fund works with the FONAFIFO platform to 
implement conservation contracts, and with 
CEDARENA (a legal NGO) as a partner to 
support the process in Osa. The Trust Fund will 
operate as a private fund, with public financial 
support: funding will be earmarked directly 
for the Trust Fund rather than going through 
general government coffers as is the case for 
FONAFIFO’s PES budget. 
Existing funds currently amount to US$17.8 
million. This includes seed capital from the 
German bank KfW, the Global Environmental 
Facility (GEF) and other groups like 
Conservation International; but 90 per cent 
still comes from state funds. The BTF plans to 
provide one-to-one matching funds for private 
investors in the Osa portfolio and other priority 
areas defined by FONAFIFO. Two instruments 
to promote private investment in the Fund 
are the Green Card (tarjeta verde) and the 
Ecomarchamo. The Green Card13 is backed 
by the Banco Nacional, and between October 
2010 and March 2012 it generated US$64,594 
through the agreed 10 per cent commission. 
Voluntary payments to offset car emissions14 
through the Ecomarchamo generated cash 
revenues of US$9504 between November 
2011 and April 2012. 
Source: Virginia Reyes, CEDARENA.  
vreyes@cedarena.org. 
12. Saenz Faerrón and Brenes Roldán, 2012.
13. See www.bncr.fi.cr/BNCR/Conozcanos/RSE.aspx.
14. See www.bncr.fi.cr/BNCR/Conozcanos/RSE.aspx.
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The aims of the pilot scheme are to generate 
forest sector employment as well as contribute to 
carbon sequestration. In its 2013 pilot phase the 
scheme is part of the ‘agroforestry system’ PES. 
Payment levels can be influenced by three 
factors: 1) administrative decisions on the 
available budget; 2) the estimated value of the 
ecosystem service provided by the forest; and 
3) the ‘opportunity costs’ to the landowner 
associated with participating. The vast majority 
of PES schemes in developing countries use a 
fixed payment per hectare. This means ‘bundling’ 
all ecosystem services into the ‘hectare’ 
measurement, multiplied by an estimated land use 
tabLe 1. Payment LeveLs and categories, 2012
activity subcategories us$/ha/
contract
annuaL 
Payment 
(us$) Per 
hectare
Protection  
(2–300 ha); contract and 
payments for 10 years
Forest protection (general) US$640 US$64
In conservation gaps US$750 US$75
In zones of importance for water US$800 US$80
Reforestation  
(1–300 ha); contract for 
15 years and payments for 
5 years 
Reforestation US$980 US$196
With native species and species in 
danger of extinction 
US$1470 US$294
Regeneration  
(2–300 ha); contract and 
payments for 10 years
In degraded areas with forestry 
potential 
US$410 US$41
In areas that qualify for 
‘additionality’ under Kyoto 
standards (CDM)* dropped for 
2013
US$640 US$64
Forest management 
(2–300 ha); contract  
and payment for 10 years
US$500 US$50
Agroforestry 
(350–5000 trees); 
contract for 5 years, 
payment for 3 years
Agroforestry services US$1.30/tree US$0.43/tree
With native species and species in 
danger of extinction
US$1.95/tree US$0.65/tree
Source: MINAET, 2011
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contribution to the services in question, rather 
than measuring actual ecosystem service flows. 
In some cases outside Costa Rica extra payments 
are made for special types of ecosystems on top 
of the basic payment per hectare – in Mexico, for 
example, cloud forests receive a higher payment. 
Although some initial studies and literature 
reviews assessed the value of forest ecosystem 
services, as part of the general consultation 
process before the introduction of the PES 
programme (Le Coq et al., 2010), the final level 
of the payments was a somewhat arbitrary 
decision. Payments for reforestation reflected 
subsidy levels prior to the introduction of the 
programme, and payments for forest protection 
were based on the price of renting land as 
pasture, as an approximation of the opportunity 
cost of forested land (about US$50/ha/year in 
1995). Studies abound on the value of different 
ecosystem services – comparing fog interception 
in cloud forests versus pastures, for instance 
(Aylward et al., 1999; Porras, 2008) – but so far 
only one study has tried to link the actual value of 
ecosystem services to payments, as described in 
Box 2. 
Although differentiated payments – and 
auctions – have been suggested to increase the 
programme’s effectiveness (see Section 6.3), 
fixed payments (or very slightly differentiated 
payments) are simpler to understand and manage; 
they can also be more transparent and cheaper to 
implement. This is the approach currently taken by 
the PES managers in Costa Rica. 
figure 3. average annuaL and Purchasing Power adJusted Pes 
Note: Average payments over the contract lifetime are also determined by contract length. The initial spike is due to a reduction 
in the contract length from 15 to 5 years in 1998. In 2006 contracts in dollars (rather than local currency) were introduced 
and contract amounts adjusted. Readjustments to raise payments for protection were made the year after. Despite short-
term fluctuation, PES purchasing power has fallen by more than 50 per cent per hectare per year since its high point in 1998. 
Source: Barton et al., 2013.
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box 2. monitoring LeveLs of ecosystem services to determine 
Payments – an exPeriment 
To date, the most significant effort to link 
payment level to provision of ecosystem 
service comes from the RIMSEC 
‘silvopastoral’ project (silvopastoral 
systems combine trees, pasture and 
livestock), executed by CATIE in Colombia, 
Nicaragua and Costa Rica. This project 
focused directly on the biodiversity and 
carbon benefits from the regeneration 
of cattle ranching sites (Ibrahim et al., 
2010; Villanueva et al., 2011). The project 
developed an ecological index for carbon 
and biodiversity at the level of individual 
farms using secondary information 
(databases, scientific and technical 
publications) and approximate calculations 
by experts. The rate of compensation 
was defined so that farmers received a 
payment based on annual improvements 
of the environmental index established 
as a baseline for every ranch. The project 
succeeded in reducing degraded pastures 
by 14.2 per cent, increased the use of 
improved pastures by 40 per cent and had 
a moderate impact on the forestry area 
(Casasola et al., 2009).
Despite simplified procedures, the project 
costs – including so-called ‘transaction 
costs’ – were high (see Table 2). Besides 
payments to the farmers, transaction 
costs included the cost of satellite 
imagery, farm-level maps, verification of 
information, digitisation and processing 
of data, and preparation of reports. 
These costs depended on the size of the 
property and the activity that was being 
monitored. Average costs were US$4.18 
per hectare, ranging from as high as 
US$10/ha in 1 hectare properties down 
to US$2/ha in properties with more than 
40 hectares. This could result in a bias 
towards monitoring larger properties in 
order to keep costs down. Although these 
costs are still too high for a national-level 
programme, advances in technology 
could help to reduce them in the future. 
Lessons from the RIMSEC project may be 
useful in designing a tool which provides 
an approximation of biodiversity within 
participating farms, and use it to determine 
both the level of payments and to monitor 
ecosystem service impacts, as required by 
the Treasury. 
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3.3 the Providers of 
ecosystem services 
The PES programme is accessible to any private 
landowner who has a property title or possession 
rights, with a minimum land area of one hectare. 
There are four main categories of participants 
(Porras, 2010; Paniagua, 2011): 
•	 Individuals (personas físicas, in Spanish).
•	 Legal entities,15 many of them sociedades 
anónimas (a Spanish term roughly equivalent 
to ‘publicly limited companies’) including 
micro-enterprises, family businesses, small and 
medium enterprises (SME), large companies 
and their subsidiaries.
•	 Development or conservation cooperatives.
•	 Indigenous communities.
Between 1997 and 2012, FONAFIFO distributed 
approximately US$340 million. The greatest part 
of these funds went to legal entities (49 per cent), 
followed by individuals (31 per cent), indigenous 
groups (13 per cent) and cooperatives (7 per 
cent) – see Figure 4. 
During the first years of the programme (1998–
2002) many contracts were handled as group 
contracts. These ‘umbrella’ projects pooled 
together groups of (usually small-scale) farmers in 
one collective contract, with the aim of minimising 
transaction costs. In practice, problems emerged 
such as the inability to enforce compliance among 
all members of a group. This led to the abolition of 
a single collective contract in favour of individually 
signed contracts with group monitoring. 
tabLe 2. ecoLogicaL index, monitoring costs and Performance-based Pes 
in the rimsec ProJect
monitoring 
costs  
(us$/ha)
ecoLogicaL 
index
Pes  
(us$/ha)
Secondary forests 1.3 1.9 142.5
Improved pastures Without trees 1.3 0.5 37.5
Low density of trees 1.3 0.9 67.5
High density of trees 1.3 1.3 97.5
Natural pastures Without trees 1.3 0.2 15
Low density of trees 1.3 0.6 45
High density of trees 1.3 1 75
Fodder banks 1.3 0.8 60
Intensive forest grazing systems 1.3 1.6 120
Riverine forests 1.7 1.5 112.5
Live fences (trees as 
hedges)
Multi-strata 3.9 1.1 82.5
Simple 6.6 0.6 45
Note: Payments were made based on expected performance in terms of biodiversity protection and carbon capture. The 
amount of PES payment is determined by multiplying the base rate of US$75/hectare by the ecological index. 
Source: Villanueva et al., 2011. 
15. Legal entities are those established through a registration process, with legal rights and liabilities that are distinct 
from their employees and shareholders. 
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figure 4. totaL funds distributed, by tyPe of ParticiPant (1997–2012)
Source: Authors’ own, using data supplied by FONAFIFO
As well as receiving direct payments, private 
forest owners who manage their forests through 
PES or in PAs are also exempt from property 
taxes. Property taxes were recently reviewed and 
raised throughout the country, so the benefits 
of the exemption have increased. Participation 
in PES also provides a guarantee of squatter 
eviction, a further benefit for land tenure. Section 
5 discusses the programme’s participants in more 
detail. 
3.4 evoLution of the 
Programme’s targeting 
strategy 
On its introduction in 1997, requests for payments 
were allocated on a first-come, first-served basis. 
However, it soon became clear that interest 
in participating in the scheme far outweighed 
the funds available and different strategies had 
to be found to prioritise contract allocation. A 
new strategy was formed based on mixtures of 
landowner and land-use characteristics. The 
Legal Entities
Cooperatives
Indigenous Associations
Individuals
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criteria used to prioritise inclusion in the scheme 
then changed over the years, which can be 
roughly grouped into three major phases since 
1998 (see Table 3): 
1. 1998 to 2002: FONAFIFO shared 
management of the PES programme with 
the National System of Conservation Areas 
(SINAC). There was no national-level strategy 
and the criteria for receiving payments varied 
according to each of SINAC’s ten regional 
offices. This wide range of criteria was not 
an effective way of targeting priority areas 
for conservation, since it covered most types 
of land use. Applications that met any of the 
criteria were selected on a first-come, first-
served basis. 
2. 2003 to 2010: FONAFIFO assumed 
management of the PES programme and 
directed the setting of priorities at a regional 
level. The number of different spatial criteria 
were reduced. Applications were selected 
on a first-come-first-evaluated-basis and then 
prioritised if they met any of the priority criteria 
(see Table 3). Each of the FONAFIFO regional 
offices was assigned a quota per contract type 
per year. 
3. 2011 to present: In 2011, the system of first-
come-first-evaluated and regional quotas was 
dropped in favour of national level priority-
setting across all ‘pre-applications’ using a 
revised matrix of priority weights. For example, 
an application from forest in an area defined as 
a ‘conservation gap’ receives 85 points. If it is 
a small property (less than 50 hectares) it will 
receive 25 additional points, making a total of 
110 points. A similar sized property with forest 
located in a non-priority area will receive 55 
initial points and an additional 25 points for 
its size, making a total of 80 points (Table 3). 
These weighting criteria can be interpreted as 
a form of implicit valuation of these property 
characteristics. The additional points given 
to smaller properties on social grounds (e.g. 
promoting participation of smaller-scale 
farmers) can have direct trade-offs in terms 
of ecosystem service provision. Smaller 
properties often result in higher fragmentation 
of the landscape, and therefore a potentially 
lower level of ecosystem services if thresholds 
are not met (e.g. landscape too fragmented to 
provide a sufficient buffer for roaming species). 
The first year of this approach saw quite large 
shifts in allocation of contracts towards regions 
with high scores such as the Osa Peninsula, 
and away from the Caribbean, for example. The 
scoring method and allocation at national level 
is expected to lead to a longer-term dynamic of 
periodic shifting of contract supply from one 
region to another. 
The priority criteria highlighted in Table 3 applies 
only to forest protection. So far all applications 
for reforestation projects have been awarded, 
provided they were technically correct. 
Applications will be prioritised that use native 
species or genetically improved material,16 or 
that reforest degraded areas with high forestry 
potential – this last category in particular complies 
with FONAFIFO’s call to boost the forestry sector. 
Agroforestry systems are designed for land 
suitable for agriculture, excluding high slopes, for 
instance. As for reforestation, the use of native 
species and agroforestry in degraded areas is 
encouraged; native species improve impacts on 
biodiversity, and agroforestry complies with the 
Kyoto Protocol17 requirements for carbon. 
16. There has been insufficient research in Costa Rica on how genetically modified species affect biodiversity. Giving 
priority to ‘genetically improved material’ may have more potential for carbon sequestration, but may also have a 
negative impact on biodiversity. 
17. For example see http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php.
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first Period second Period third Period
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
PresidentiaL decree # 25828
26141
26977 27808 28610 29394 30090 31081 31767 32226 33226 33852 34371 35119 35762 36516 36935
Criteria:
Conservation area (CA) specific criteria
W
ho
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ou
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 / 
no
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s
See Note below
Non-priority Forest 60 55 55
Indigenous territories 6. 6. 80/75* 85 85
Conservation gaps (GRUAS II) § /3. § /3. 80/75* 85 85
Protected areas (PA) 1.§ /4. 1§ /4. 80/75* 75 75
Forest protecting water resources 80 80 80
Biological corridor (GRUAS, CBM) 2.§ / 5. 2§ /5. 80/70* 80** 80**
Ecomercados#, KfWproject areas
Non-expropriated properties 9. PA 9.PN/
RB
AP AP AP
Expiring forest management PES 8. 8. 65
Expiring contract this year +5 +10 +10
Expired PES contract 7. 7. +5
Expired CAFMA >10yrs
Low SDI (<40%) 10. 10. +5 +10 +10
Contracts1, properties2 <50 ha +101 +252 +252
tabLe 3. evoLution of forest Protection Priority criteria, 1998–2013
Notes: Shading indicates when a criterion is used. Different shading corresponds to the main periods of priority criteria. Only 
the last period uses points. *when not in combination with other criteria, **mutually exclusive criteria, § order of priority in 
combination with conservation gaps / or alone; # Ecomercado biological corridors (GRUAS: Tortuguero, Amistad-Caribe 
and Osa; KfW: Huertar Norte, Sarapiqui; Tortuguero, Barbilla, Fila Costena and Corcovado. CA: conservation area specific 
targeting criteria (e.g. ACOSA divided into 9 areas with different priority criteria); Reg. Points system with regional quotas; 
Natl. Points system with no regional quotas. ASP: protected areas which include PN: national parks; and RB: biological 
reserves. 
SINAC criteria (1998–2002) were multiple and often overlapping. It provided priority to applications of forests located in 
indigenous territories, protected areas, biological corridors and buffer areas around these sites, Ecomercados sites, forest 
protecting water resources, endangered species, land use categories over VI and areas prone to soil degradation, any 
forest succession stanges, abandoned pastures, areas with regeneration protential, forest located in areas prone to fire risk, 
landslides, flooding, arqueological sites at risk, areas of high scenic beauty, foresty potential, coastal marine zone forest, and 
forest managed by successful forest organisations. 
Source: Authors’ own, based on Barton et al. (2013)
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See Note below
Non-priority Forest 60 55 55
Indigenous territories 6. 6. 80/75* 85 85
Conservation gaps (GRUAS II) § /3. § /3. 80/75* 85 85
Protected areas (PA) 1.§ /4. 1§ /4. 80/75* 75 75
Forest protecting water resources 80 80 80
Biological corridor (GRUAS, CBM) 2.§ / 5. 2§ /5. 80/70* 80** 80**
Ecomercados#, KfWproject areas
Non-expropriated properties 9. PA 9.PN/
RB
AP AP AP
Expiring forest management PES 8. 8. 65
Expiring contract this year +5 +10 +10
Expired PES contract 7. 7. +5
Expired CAFMA >10yrs
Low SDI (<40%) 10. 10. +5 +10 +10
Contracts1, properties2 <50 ha +101 +252 +252
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3.5 a ruLes, reguLations and 
rewards framework
The PES programme has been described as not 
just a single economic instrument, but rather a 
‘policy mix’ (Barton et al., 2013). A policy mix is 
a combination of policy instruments, which has 
evolved to influence the quantity and quality of 
biodiversity conservation and ecosystem service 
provision in public and private sectors (Ring 
and Schröter-Schlaack, 2011). The policy mix in 
this case includes the Forest Law that created 
the PES (Law 7575, 1996), annual presidential 
decrees determining PES priorities, the PES 
Operational Manual, and other ‘soft’ instruments 
like regulatory plans and the determination of 
buffer and conservation areas. The Institutional 
Analysis and Design (IAD) framework developed 
by Ostrom (2005), can be used to describe PES 
in terms of its ‘rules-in-use’ (see Table 4). Rules-
in-use are both formal – created by legislation 
and regulation – and informal, created over time 
by communities to govern landuse practices. 
‘Rules-in-use’ provides an analytical framework for 
characterising the institutional characteristics of 
PES, extending the analysis of incentives for land 
use management beyond only payment levels and 
sanctions (Barton et al., 2013). 
 
tabLe 4. Pes mix of ‘ruLes-in-use’ according to the institutionaL 
anaLysis and design (iad) framework 
iad ruLe-
in-use
aPPLication to 
generaL Pes examPLe
examPLes of ruLes-in-use in Pes in 
costa rica
Pay-off rules
Rewards and 
sanctions 
for particular 
outcomes
Conditionality, mode of payment, 
payment principle, payment 
schedule by PES modality, timing 
of payment, transaction costs or 
intermediaries’ fees, fines and 
other sanctions 
•	 Payments allocated according to land activity
•	 Properties receiving PES are exempt from property 
taxes(a)
•	 Eviction of squatters(b)
•	 Sanctions: clearing established forest with intent is 
illegal and punishable by prison sentences of up to 
3 years(c) 
Choice rules
Allowed, 
required or 
forbidden 
actions at a 
particular time
Length of contract, permitted 
land uses (proxies for ecosystem 
services – ES), contractual 
management measures
•	 Permitted land uses: forest protection, reforestation, 
forest management and agroforestry 
•	 Prohibition to change land use in established forests(d) 
•	 Passive regulation through buffer zone regulations 
that restrict land use in and around natural springs, 
along rivers and streams, around lakes, and in recharge 
zones(e) 
Scope rules
Outcomes to 
observe that 
may/ may not 
be affected by 
action 
Proxy indicators for biodiversity 
and ecosystem services (land-
use/service link), baseline 
scenario, conservation target, 
budget 
•	 Budget allocation to different modalities (annual 
presidential decrees)
•	 Forest cover, number of trees, at farm level
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iad ruLe-
in-use
aPPLication to 
generaL Pes examPLe
examPLes of ruLes-in-use in Pes in 
costa rica
Aggregation 
rules
single/ multiple 
participation, 
agreement 
rules
Consensus or majority rules on 
priority setting, selection criteria 
etc., agglomeration bonuses 
or minimum contiguous area 
requirements for collective PES 
contracts
•	 Voting rules of FONAFIFO board in determining 
priority-setting criteria and weights (sector 
representation)
•	 Regional versus national annual PES allocation quotas 
•	 Rules for group contracts(previously)
Information 
rules
(level of 
Information, 
transparency
Free prior informed consent 
(FPIC), public hearing 
processes, freedom of 
information, monitoring, 
reportingand verification (MRV) 
requirements, application 
process rights and obligations 
•	 Application procedures online and by telephone
•	 Grace periods for obtaining necessary documentation 
for application process
Boundary 
rules
eligibility and 
exit rules that 
define holder 
and non-holder 
positions
Rules defining: 
landowner eligibility, contract 
selection, administration 
area, priority areas/locations, 
application fees, contract 
renewal criteria, contract 
cancellation criteria, min/max 
PES contract area
•	 Priority land uses, landowners and eligibility set by 
annual presidential decrees
•	 Official requirement for FONAFIFO to support small 
and medium-sized forestry producers and rural 
development (work and wellbeing)(f) 
•	 System of points-based scoring and ranking of 
proposals (annual presidential decrees)
•	 Property titles correctly registered in the National 
Register18 or uncontested possessory rights in order
Position rules
decision-
making 
positions for 
actors at a 
particular time
Rules defining: 
actions of instrument initiator, 
financing institution, external 
donors, priority-setting, ES 
buyers (tax contributors, utilities 
users, certificate purchasers), 
ES beneficiaries, PES 
applicants, participants / ES 
seller, intermediary/facilitator, 
monitoring authority, reporter, 
verifier, evaluator 
•	 Responsibility of the state to guarantee a balanced use 
of its ecosystems(g) 
•	 FONAFIFO board determines priority-setting criteria 
and weights (sector representation)
•	 FONAFIFO is mandated to manage the PES(h), 
allocated state funding and has the authority (but not 
a monopoly)19 to search for alternative sources of 
national and international funding for PES
•	 Regente forestal (forest engineer) as contract 
intermediary
Notes: (a) Law 7575, art 23. (b) Law 7575, art 36. (c) Law 7575, art 19. (d) Law 7575, art 19. (e) Law 7575, art. 33: 100 
metres around natural springs, 10–15m along rivers and streams, 50m around lakes, variable distance in recharge zones. 
(f) Law 7575, art 3(k), and executive decrees N° 31633-MINAE and N° 31081-MINAE. (g) National Constitution and Law 
7575, art 1. (h)Law 7575, art 46. (i) (Law 7575, art 69; for tax simplification and efficiency Nº 8114, article. 50. (j) Decree Nº 
32868-MINAE, Article 14. Source: Barton et al. (2013).
18. There are many reported inconsistencies with the national property cadastre (register), which is currently under 
development.
19. The PES programme does not operate as a monopoly, and co-exists with independent local schemes. One 
example is the private hydroelectric company La Esperanza (see www.eea.europa.eu/atlas/teeb/pes-as-a-strategy-to/
view) which makes direct payments to a private reserve protecting cloud forest in their catchment area. The water utility 
ESPH (see www.watershedmarkets.org/casestudies/Costa_Rica_ESPH.html) also entered a voluntary agreement 
with landowners in their catchment area, and although it operated independently for several years it has recently joined 
efforts with FONAFIFO. Even more recently, the local NGO FUNDECOR introduced a direct carbon payment (PSA 
Solidario) targeting small and medium farmers who do not qualify under the national PES scheme (for instance those 
without property titles). 
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Costa Rica’s PES programme needs to be 
evaluated for its effectiveness in promoting 
the protection of ecosystem services. Ideally it 
should be evaluated for its protection of water 
and biodiversity, carbon sequestration and 
landscape beauty, though usually a proxy such 
as forest cover is used instead. Its intended 
and unintended secondary impacts on people 
should also be assessed. The task is not easy. 
Environmental programmes like Costa Rica’s PES 
are often designed with a weak understanding of 
causal relationships, which limit how effectively 
they can be evaluated (Ferraro, 2009). This 
makes it particularly hard to identify what impacts 
or outcomes to measure, and which tools to 
measure with. To explicitly account for multiple 
conservation and social objectives and indicators, 
a mix of methods, a theory-based approach, 
and qualitative evaluation of causality is needed 
(Ferraro, 2009). 
The clarity of the concepts used is key to 
understanding impacts. This section presents 
a brief introduction to the main sources of 
information used to report on the programme’s 
impacts. Much of this information is also used to 
look at impacts on people, in Section 5. 
4.1 existing information 
In Costa Rica, the PES programme uses an 
input-based approach, where the amount of forest 
cover is usually used as a proxy for ecosystem 
services delivered. Measuring the area under 
approved land categories (forest protection, forest 
plantations, natural regeneration, or agroforestry 
systems) is used for monitoring, without explicit 
indicators for the quality of the ecosystem service 
(whether the water is cleaner, for instance). Each 
land category is expected to affect forest cover in 
different ways: 
Land 
category
imPact on forest 
cover
Forest 
protection
Maintaining existing forest stock, 
reducing risk of deforestation
Reforestation Increasing forest cover 
Natural 
regeneration
Increasing forest cover
Evaluations should first take into account whether 
the agreed form of land management results in 
changes in forest cover, ensuring that landowners 
have complied with the agreed PES categories 
in their contracts. Second, it is important to 
demonstrate whether these changes are 
‘additional’ – do they add environmental benefits 
that would not have occurred without this type of 
land management? This requires constructing a 
plausible ‘counterfactual’, or study of what would 
have happened in the absence of the programme, 
for each PES contract. To assess programme 
impacts, we look at the following information: 
•	 A review of existing studies and evaluations 
of Costa Rica’s PES impacts on ecosystem 
services and social impacts;
•	 FONAFIFO’s database containing information 
on all PES contracts for the 1997–2012 period; 
•	 Demographic statistics at the district 
level supplied by the Ministry of Planning 
(MIDEPLAN).
Table 5 presents the main studies looking at 
both ecosystem and socio-economic impacts, 
with and without control groups, as well as at 
different scales. Other studies are also referenced 
throughout the document. 
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4.2 rePorted imPacts 
This section presents the programme’s impacts 
in terms of forest area covered by PES contracts, 
and results from the main impact evaluation 
studies. 
Since its inception in 1997, the PES programme 
has promoted conservation in private properties 
at an average of 60,000 hectares per year. 
Cumulatively over the period, this represents 
961,000 hectares of forests, and nearly 4.4 million 
trees as part of its agroforestry scheme. Forest 
protection dominates the programme: it makes 
up 67 per cent of the total number of contracts 
allocated, 90 per cent of the total hectares of 
forest with PES, and has an 83 per cent share of 
the total budget (see Figure 5 and Table 6). The 
programme has also introduced forest plantations 
across 61,500 hectares, supported sustainable 
forest management in 27,500 hectares and 
encouraged natural regeneration in 9600 
hectares of abandoned pastures. 
tabLe 5. main studies evaLuating the imPact of the Pes Programme in 
costa rica
LeveL without controL grouPs comPared with controL grouPs 
(without Pes)
Regional Participation in PES. Protection and 
reforestation in Virilla (Miranda et al., 
2003)
PES, all modalities 1999–2003 in the 
Osa Peninsula (Barton et al., 2009)
Participation in PES in Los Chiles, San 
Carlos, Sarapiquí (Zbinden and Lee, 2005)
Participation in PES in the Osa Peninsula in 
2003 (Sierra and Russman, 2006)
Participation in PES in the San Juan-La Selva 
biological corridor (Morse et al., 2009)
PES agroforestry in Buenos Aires (Cole, 
2010)
PES protection in Sarapiquí (Arriagada et al., 
2010) using matching*
National Participation in PES protection 
1997–2002 (Ortiz et al., 2003)
PES protection 1999–2005 (Tattenbach et 
al., 2008)
All PES modalities 1997–2000 (Sánchez-
Azofiefa et al., 2007)
PES protection 2000–2005 (Robalino et al., 
2008) using matching
PES protection (Arriagada, 2008; Sills et al., 
2008) using matching
PES protection evaluated by region (Robalino 
et al., 2011) using matching
Note: (*) ‘Matching’ is a technique of econometrics widely used in project evaluation. It is based on the comparison of results 
of an individual who participates in an event with an individual with comparable characteristics (‘matched’) who does not 
participate. 
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These figures are not negligible and give an initial 
overview of the programme’s increasing reach. 
However, they need to be read with caution. 
The statistics presented in Figure 5 and Table 
6 represent the totals (contracts, hectares and 
dollars) allocated to date, and include ongoing 
contracts as well as those that have expired and 
been renewed. The figure for the total number 
of hectares therefore includes some double-
counting of renewed contracts, especially in forest 
protection contracts which have the shortest 
contract time.20 
figure 5. totaL hectares under Pes, 1997–2012 
Source: Authors’ own, using data supplied by FONAFIFO. 
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20. Keeping track of renewed contracts is not straightforward. Properties change ownership and registration numbers, 
and can be sold and subdivided. Analysis based on GIS (geographical information system) will help but data collected 
on contracts has used different (not always compatible) systems that make comparisons over time difficult. FONAFIFO 
is currently working on standardising GIS systems. 
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tabLe 6. number of contracts, hectares and budget aLLocation by 
category and year
totaL budget aLLocation (miLLions of us$)
year Protection reforestation sfm* af* regeneration totaL
1997 30.3 1.9 2.7 34.8
1998 4.8 7.3 4.2 16.4
1999 10.3 1.5 1.6 13.5
2000 5.6 0.1 0.0 5.7
2001 7.1 1.2 0.5 8.8
2002 5.7 0.9 0.8 7.4
2003 16.3 2.1 0.1 18.5
2004 19.2 2.0 0.4 21.7
2005 26.8 1.7 0.4 29.0
2006 6.8 2.9 0.5 0.3 10.4
2007 20.9 3.6 0.7 0.2 25.4
2008 23.2 3.5 0.6 0.4 27.6
2009 18.6 3.6 0.5 0.4 23.1
2010 22.7 3.3 0.1 0.7 0.3 27.0
2011 24.4 4.2 0.1 0.8 0.5 30.1
2012 38.1 3.3 0.0 0.6 0.3 42.4
% of total 82% 13% 3% 2% 1% 100%
Total 280.9 43.2 10.1 5.3 2.3 341.8
* SFM: Sustainable Forest Management; AF: agroforestry Note: agroforestry contracts are measured by number of trees per 
contract, and not by number of hectares, unlike the other categories. 
Source: Authors’ own, using data supplied by FONAFIFO
Figure 5 shows that annual contracting has 
experienced large variations, but has been 
relatively stable since the 2007. The total 
hectares contracted is determined by the annual 
budget and does not reveal the number of 
applicants (supply). However, it is noteworthy that 
FONAFIFO has been able to maintain as higher 
level of contracting in 2012 than in 1998 despite 
the real value of PES having fallen by more than 
50 per cent in the same time period (Figure 
3). While we do not track the total supply of 
applicants over time, this is an indirect indication 
of falling opportunity costs of forest conservation 
in the same period.
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tabLe 6. number of contracts, hectares and budget aLLocation by 
category and year (cont.)
totaL number of contracts
year Protection reforestation sfm af regeneration totaL
1997 553 55 75 683
1998 485 158 103 746
1999 651 140 74 865
2000 355 83 438
2001 381 99 23 503
2002 344 72 36 452
2003 696 138 78 912
2004 937 213 159 1309
2005 705 178 165 1048
2006 295 202 179 15 691
2007 845 239 252 23 1359
2008 785 205 275 23 1288
2009 593 163 207 18 981
2010 875 187 4 266 16 1348
2011 952 232 6 274 29 1493
2012 843 161 2 232 21 1259
% of total 67% 16% 2% 14% 1% 100%
Total 10,295 2525 323 2087 145 15,375
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Evaluation of the programme’s outcomes requires 
looking beyond overall statistics. The ultimate 
question when evaluating the ecosystem impacts 
of the programme is whether or not PES protects 
ecosystem services. Although simple, this 
question involves looking at: 
•	 Indicators used to measure PES environmental 
effectiveness (either ‘output-based’ like water 
quality, tonnes of carbon sequestered, and so 
on; or ‘input-based’, like area of forest cover).
•	 Impacts on ecosystem services from different 
land uses, and possible ‘trade-offs’, for example 
between ecosystem services from protection 
of forests in large areas versus agroforestry in 
relatively smaller areas.
•	 ‘Additionality’ (see glossary): including forests 
at risk of changing in the scheme, or focusing 
on areas with high quantity or quality of 
forest but at low risk of change, like forests in 
indigenous reservations.
•	 ’Neighbourhood’ and spill-over effects 
(see glossary) induced by the programme 
interacting with other conservation policies, 
such as national park management affecting the 
tabLe 6. number of contracts, hectares and budget aLLocation by 
category and year (cont.)
thousands of hectares and trees in agroforestry 
year Protection reforestation sfm regeneration Pes 
totaL 
ha
trees 
in af*
1997 84.9 3.4 7.4 95.7
1997 19.6 11.7 11.0 42.3
1997 46.6 2.7 4.7 54.0
2000 25.2 1.9 — 27.1
2001 31.1 2.1 1.4 34.6
2002 24.6 1.5 2.2 28.3
2003 71.0 3.5 74.4 103.4
2004 83.9 3.5 87.4 320.3
2005 58.2 3.0 61.2 452.2
2006 21.3 3.5 0.4 25.3 362.9
2007 65.0 4.5 1.1 70.5 545.2
2008 72.2 4.3 1.8 78.3 596.9
2009 56.8 4.3 1.8 62.9 363.9
2010 69.5 4.0 0.3 1.3 75.2 554.1
2011 74.9 4.3 0.5 2.4 82.0 633.7
2012 57.6 3.4 0.0 0.8 61.9 454.7
% of total 90% 6% 3% 1% 100% 100%
Total 862.5 61.5 27.5 9.5 961.0 4387.2
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probability fo participating in PES in the park 
buffer zone.
•	 Understanding the relationship between 
the voluntary nature of participation and the 
quality of forests included in the programme; 
e.g. allowing landowners to self-select under 
voluntary participation will not target priority 
areas for conservation.
•	 Understanding how landowners’ characteristics 
(such as level of education) affect the likelihood 
of their participation in the programme. 
Increments in the target variable (for example, 
hectares of forest) are considered ‘additional’ 
if they would not have happened without PES. 
Although the requisite of additionality is not 
explicit in the PES programme design or the law 
that frames the programme, it is nevertheless 
important for international carbon projects like 
REDD, and it also makes economic sense to 
target actions that have positive outcomes. 
Finding areas that ensure additionality is 
increasingly difficult and more expensive. As 
the ‘cheap’ conservation of remote areas is 
exhausted, conservation must focus on areas 
with stronger competition for land use, like 
urbanisation or high-value export crops.
Evaluation should ideally include longitudinal 
analysis (analysing data collected over a long 
period of time) looking carefully at baselines 
and a similar set of co-variables that explain the 
level of ecosystem service or forest cover at the 
country level. However, the studies presented 
in Table 5 are highly place and time specific and 
many of the questions above remain unanswered. 
Comparison of results is difficult, as they used 
different methodologies, information collected 
by FONAFIFO was not uniform for the different 
periods as they focus on different regions, use 
different baselines (or none) and were carried 
out in different years. As noted by Daniels et al. 
(2010),21 the heterogeneity of studies and the lack 
of understanding of PES cohorts22 make it difficult 
to provide generalised conclusions about PES 
impacts. With this in mind, it is still possible to 
distil a few conclusions from the studies: 
•	 The type of methodology used to assess 
impacts, and how these are defined, affects the 
results obtained.
•	 PES impacts need to be understood and 
evaluated in relation to other conservation 
instruments, such as PAs.
•	 Reported impacts are site-specific, and are 
also affected by the characteristics of the 
participant, such as his or her capacity for 
management contracts.
•	 Strategies that target priority areas for 
conservation help environmental effectiveness, 
but can also help social effectiveness if 
designed with this in mind. 
So far, environmental effectiveness has been 
measured according to the type of forest 
cover. Effects are measured as forest gain, 
forest loss, and net deforestation (Arriagada, 
2008). However, recent studies have observed 
significant errors in classifying forests (Kalacska 
et al., 2008), for example making it difficult to 
identify threatened deciduous dryland forests in 
21. See Daniels et al. (2010) for an in-depth analysis of research methods used in existing impact evaluation studies. 
22. A cohort is a group of subjects who have shared a particular event together during a particular time span, such as 
landowners accessing PES between 1997 and 2005.
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high biomass herbaceous areas. Newer studies 
are trying to use more refined information, 
including the 2010 EarthSat Geographical 
Information System (GIS) land cover dataset.23 
This has given an initial error matrix lower than 
in earlier studies (Kalacska et al., 2008) and a 
better definition of proxies for ecosystem services 
other than forest cover. These newer studies use 
established methodologies to measure the four 
ecosystem services:
•	 Carbon storage – forest biomass is measured 
using optimal remote sensing data and existing 
forest inventory data (Gibbs et al., 2007).
•	 Biodiversity complementarity24 – based on 
forest types and environmental characteristics 
(Barton et al., 2009), and biodiversity 
connectivity index (Morse et al., 2009).
•	 Hydrological services – priority catchments for 
drinking water and hydropower25.
•	 Landscape aesthetics – for example, proximity 
to major tourism attractions.
Existing studies suggest that results monitoring 
the programme’s effectiveness depend heavily 
on what is measured and how. In their study of 
the San Juan-La Selva biological corridor in the 
north of Costa Rica, Morse et al. (2009) suggest 
that the PES’s effectiveness increases if it is 
measured as ‘protecting existing forest’, rather 
than ‘increasing forest cover’. They also report a 
positive (although small) impact on forest cover. 
On the other hand, a study of buffer zones around 
a national park by Schelhas and Sanchez-Azofeifa 
(2006) finds only a ‘slight detectable forest 
recovery’ through PES. Although the difference 
in tendencies can be attributed to different 
methodologies, a common agreement from the 
literature seems to be that better ‘environmental 
targeting’ is likely to increase the programme’s 
effectiveness. Targeting seeks out areas of 
environmental importance, to engage landowners 
in participation in PES by providing additional 
incentives, rather than leaving landowners to self-
select though voluntary participation. However, 
this would be more costly to implement. Using 
weighted criteria as part of the national level 
approach introduced in 2011 is also expected to 
increase the programme’s outcomes, but it is too 
soon to measure this. 
PES performance is often compared to the 
performance of PAs. Pfaff et al. (2008) found 
that PAs in Costa Rica had an annual rate of 
‘avoided deforestation’ (deforestation that would 
have happened without the policy instrument) of 
0.18 to 0.35 per cent from 1981–96, depending 
on assumptions made in their impact analysis 
method (see Table 7). The lower end of this 
range compares to the 0.13 to 0.26 per cent 
estimated by Pfaff et al. (2009) for 1986 to 1996 
and to the upper range (0.2 per cent) found for 
PES effectiveness from 1997 to 2005 in the 
areas of the country most prone to deforestation 
(Arriagada et al., 2010). Based on this simple 
comparison of impact evaluation results for forests 
at different locations and for different periods, 
PAs appear to be more effective from 1981 to 
1996 than PES has been from 1997 to 2005 
for protecting standing old growth forest, while 
PES is more effective for increasing secondary 
forest cover.
The weakness of impact evaluation studies to 
date, on PES in Costa Rica and elsewhere; is that 
studies have focused exclusively on changes in 
forest cover, mostly deforestation rates, without 
distinguishing between forest types and their 
biodiversity conservation value. Furthermore, the 
‘policymix’ question asks where in the mosaic of 
various land uses (e.g. old growth, regeneration) 
the different instruments such as PES and 
PAs are most effective, given that they address 
somewhat different environmental and social 
objectives. If PES is seen as just one part of a 
policymix purposefully targeted to complement 
multiple-use PAs, impact evaluation should also 
be designed to look at the combined effect of 
PES and PA. 
23. Developed by the US-EPA and based on Landsat imagery with 90m x 90m resolution.
24. Complementarity describes how different species use resources more effectively by coexisting, since each 
species has different resource requirements, and hence become more productive. The biodiversity complementarity 
value of a particular area under consideration within a set of conservation areas is related to its contribution to the 
increment in biodiversity representation in relation to an overall biodiversity conservation target (Barton et al., 2009). 
25. See for example www.sirefor.go.cr (in Spanish).
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tabLe 7. imPact evaLuation studies of Pes and Pa on forest cover in  
costa rica
 
study Pes tyPe/
Protected area 
category
Period area covariate 
estimation
measure resoLution 1960 1986 1996/7 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
nationaL
Andam et al., 2008 ASP: PN, RB, RF, ZP, RSV 1960–1997 National CVM deforest. 3ha 0.27–0.35%
Pfaff et al., 2009 ASP: PN, RB 1986–1997 National CVM deforest. 28x28m 0.13–0.26%
Tattenbach et al., 2008 PES: P, M, R 1999–2005 National R deforest. no data 1.43%(projection)
Sanchez-Azofeifa et al., 2007 PES: P, M, R 1997–2000 National R deforest. 5x5km 0%(n.s.)
Robalino et al., 2008 PES: P 2000–2005 National CVM deforest. 28x28m 0.38–0.42%
Arriagada 2008; Sills et al., 2008 PES: P 1996–2005 National CVM net change census tract 0.78%–1.2%
Robalino et al., 2011 PES: P 2000–2005 National CVM deforest. 28x28m 0.61% 0.69%
regionaL
Sierra & Russmann 2006 PES: P, M, R 1997–2003 Peninsula Osa R brush property positive
Sierra & Russmann 2006 PES: P, M, R 1997–2003 Peninsula Osa R prim.forest property negstive
Robalino et al., 2011 PeS: P 2000–2005 Palmar Norte # CVM deforest. 28x28m 0.17%(n.s.)
Morse et al., 2009 PES: P, M, R (CB) 1996–2001 San Juan La Selva DP net change 1ha 0.11%
Morse et al., 2009 PES: P, M, R (CB) 1996–2001 San Juan La Selva DP deforest. 1ha 1.33%
Arriagada et al., 2012 PES: P 1996–2005 Sarapiqui CVM net change property 1.11%–1.67%
Robalino et al., 2011 PES: P 2000–2005 Sarapiqui # CVM deforest. 28x28m 0.40%
Robalino et al., 2011 PES: P 2000–2005 San Carlos # CVM deforest. 28x28m 0.77%
Robalino et al., 2011 PES: P 2000–2005 San José # CVM deforest. 28x28m 0.34%
Robalino et al., 2011 PES: P 2000–2005 Pococí # CVM deforest. 28x28m 0.047%(n.s.)
Robalino et al., 2011 PES: P 2000–2005 Nicoya # CVM deforest. 28x28m 0%
Robalino et al., 2011 PES: P 2000–2005 Limón # CVM deforest. 28x28m 0%
Robalino et al., 2011 PES: P 2000–2005 Cañas # CVM deforest. 28x28m 0%
four
assessing the Programme’s imPacts on ecosystems 
continued
Notes: n.s. (not significant at 10%); Area: # FONAFIFO regional office. Types: PES: P=protection; M=forest management; 
R=reforestation; Protected Areas: NP=national park; RB=biological reserves; RF=forest reserves, ZP=protected zones; 
RVS=wildlife refuges; CB=biological corridor. Covariate estimation: DP=difference in means; R=regression; M=matching 
techniques. Source: Authors’ own
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study Pes tyPe/
Protected area 
category
Period area covariate 
estimation
measure resoLution 1960 1986 1996/7 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
nationaL
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Arriagada 2008; Sills et al., 2008 PES: P 1996–2005 National CVM net change census tract 0.78%–1.2%
Robalino et al., 2011 PES: P 2000–2005 National CVM deforest. 28x28m 0.61% 0.69%
regionaL
Sierra & Russmann 2006 PES: P, M, R 1997–2003 Peninsula Osa R brush property positive
Sierra & Russmann 2006 PES: P, M, R 1997–2003 Peninsula Osa R prim.forest property negstive
Robalino et al., 2011 PeS: P 2000–2005 Palmar Norte # CVM deforest. 28x28m 0.17%(n.s.)
Morse et al., 2009 PES: P, M, R (CB) 1996–2001 San Juan La Selva DP net change 1ha 0.11%
Morse et al., 2009 PES: P, M, R (CB) 1996–2001 San Juan La Selva DP deforest. 1ha 1.33%
Arriagada et al., 2012 PES: P 1996–2005 Sarapiqui CVM net change property 1.11%–1.67%
Robalino et al., 2011 PES: P 2000–2005 Sarapiqui # CVM deforest. 28x28m 0.40%
Robalino et al., 2011 PES: P 2000–2005 San Carlos # CVM deforest. 28x28m 0.77%
Robalino et al., 2011 PES: P 2000–2005 San José # CVM deforest. 28x28m 0.34%
Robalino et al., 2011 PES: P 2000–2005 Pococí # CVM deforest. 28x28m 0.047%(n.s.)
Robalino et al., 2011 PES: P 2000–2005 Nicoya # CVM deforest. 28x28m 0%
Robalino et al., 2011 PES: P 2000–2005 Limón # CVM deforest. 28x28m 0%
Robalino et al., 2011 PES: P 2000–2005 Cañas # CVM deforest. 28x28m 0%
The study by Pfaff et al. (2009) of the 1997–2000 
cohorts of PES contracts found that most 
contracts were located on land with very low 
probability of deforestation, suggesting low 
additionality from the payments. It also found that 
PES prevented loss of forest on only 0.21 per 
cent of land included in the scheme, compared 
to expected forest loss without payments. 
Robalino’s study from 2000 to 2005 (Robalino 
et al., 2008) found that less than 0.4 per cent of 
the plots enrolled in the programme would have 
been deforested annually without payments. 
The main reason cited was ecotourism bringing 
value to forests, but also the enforcement of other 
conservation policies, like the ban on land-use 
change. A study by Blackman and Woodward 
(2010) shows that by 2005 only a third of the 
land under PES was located in land important for 
hydrological services, and between 30 and 65 
per cent in areas key for biodiversity.
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According to Estrada and DeClerck (2011) the 
Costa Rican case illustrates what happens in 
most existing PES schemes: participation is led 
by landowners and is greatly influenced by the 
landowner’s management capacity – his ability to 
cover transaction, legal and information costs, and 
to satisfy land tenure requirements. This results 
in payments being highly dispersed (resulting in 
fragmentation of the landscape) or taking place 
in areas where the threat to conservation is nil 
or very low, but the socio-economic conditions 
are more conducive to PES. A lack of targeting 
further limits the programme’s ability to achieve 
better outcomes (Pfaff et al., 2008; Robalino et 
al., 2008).
There have been a number of suggestions as 
to what criteria to use for targeting. These have 
included areas that face high deforestation 
pressures (Robalino et al., 2008); continuous 
blocks of forests in areas with high probability 
of natural disasters, like flooding or landslides 
(Ortiz et al., 2003); forest connectivity (e.g. 
biological corridors) and potential for biodiversity 
complementarity (Barton et al., 2009). Ortiz et 
al. (2003) also suggested targeting areas with a 
low scoring on the SDI to prioritise participation 
from potentially poorer landowners. The study 
by Miranda et al. (2003) in the Virilla watershed 
suggested flexible approaches to regeneration on 
vulnerable hillsides and marginal areas protecting 
water sources. In their study of the Osa Peninsula, 
Sierra and Russman (2006) proposed that 
PES may result in more additionality if used for 
landscape restoration. Shifting participation in 
the programme to non-forested areas and forest/
agriculture interfaces to increase additionality 
will require shifting the focus from the currently 
dominant PES for forest conservation to natural 
regeneration, agroforestry and silvopastoral 
systems. Daniels’ interpretation of Sierra and 
Russman’s results suggests that ‘capturing 
more landholders already engaged in non-forest 
land use suggests the possibility of greater PES 
additionality via limiting agricultural expansion, 
ensuring forest in an agricultural mosaic, and 
diversifying farm income in a way that produces 
land rent from the provision of ecosystem services 
rather than agriculture alone’ (Daniels et al., 2010: 
2123).
The second part of the programme (see the three 
phases in Table 3) saw the beginnings of a shift 
towards better targeting, taking connectivity 
into account and following a better landscape-
based planning approach (see Daniels et al., 
2010), introducing agroforestry contracts, and 
opening local FONAFIFO offices in areas with 
high risk of land-use change. As a result, impact 
studies from the second stage of the programme 
show improved effectiveness (Robalino et al., 
2011; Arriagada, 2010). Arriagada’s in-depth 
econometric study in the northern and Sarapiquí 
areas show how the scheme has led to increases 
in forest cover on participating farms over a period 
of 9 years. 
Targeting presumes a better understanding of 
how local characteristics and other confounding 
variables affect participation, and comparisons 
of forest cover on land with and without PES. 
Some of these factors are explained in Table 8, 
which shows some of the statistically significant 
variables used in various models measuring the 
probability of participating in the programme 
and the probability of participation leading to 
increased forest cover. Positive correlations are 
found in almost all variables linked to location 
(remoteness of the farms, those located in high 
slopes, at higher elevations, and with higher 
precipitation levels); landowners’ characteristics 
(education; off-farm income; property titles); and 
access to programme extension.
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tabLe 8. examPLes of exPLanatory variabLes for Pes ParticiPation
factors determining the 
ProbabiLity of ParticiPation in Pes
factors determining 
effectiveness on forest 
cover of Pes vs. no Pes 
(farm LeveL)census tract 
LeveL
farm LeveL
Covariates
Arriagada 
2008
Robalino 
et al., 
2011
Zbinden 
& Lee 
2005
Morse 
et al., 
2011
Sills 
et al., 
2008
Sierra & 
Russmann 
2006
Sanchez-
Azofeifa 
et al., 
2007
Arriagada 
et al., 
2010
Location
Distance to San José –
Distance to nearest town – + +/0
Distance to nearest national road +
Distance to nearest local road +
Distance to nearest sawmill +
Distance to Atlantic coast –
Distance to Pacific coast +
Distance to forestry office +
Distance to nearest port –
Area natural characteristics
Precipitation/Precipitation^2 +
High slope + – + + + +
Elevation +
Area socio-economic characteristics
Population density –
Priority of ecomercados project +
Protected area not eligible for PES –
Percentage immigrant households +
Percentage households use firewood +
Percentage off-farm employment –
Farm characteristics
Farm area + +
Property has land title +
IDA settlement +
Deforestation rate prior to PES –
Initial forest cover + + +
High soil land use capacity –
Opportunity cost of landuse change +
Transport cost +
Soil degradation +
Farmer characteristics
Indebtedness +
Owner age
Owner education +
Residency on farm since 1996 –
Off-farm income +
Agricultural income –
Family labour –
Prior participation forestry incentives +
Prior recipient of extension services +
Owner from Central Valley +
Source: Authors’ own
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Ecosystems services are essentially about the 
benefits that people get from nature26. Thus 
PES is as much about people as it is about 
the environment. This has been continually 
highlighted at international, national and local 
levels, through the green economy and social 
responsibility concepts, social justice in REDD+, 
and from the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 
goals promoted by the United Nations, down to 
the people who are actually affected. Protection 
of a healthy ecosystem benefits many, especially 
beyond those who receive cash for participating 
in the PES. It is particularly important for poorer 
people who have fewer options for adapting to 
deteriorating conditions, and whose livelihoods 
are more reliant on natural resources. 
While recognising the wider benefits to society 
from PES, this section focuses primarily on the 
impacts on the people directly participating 
(or excluded from participation) in the PES 
programme, and strategies to improve its 
social outcomes.
Incorporating a social agenda within an 
environmental programme is not easy – and it 
involves trade-offs in terms of costs, benefits, 
winners and losers. It typically leads to higher 
costs in implementing the programme and can 
mean reduced ecosystem benefits, especially 
when working with small-scale, potentially 
scattered farmers rather than large-scale 
landowners. But it can also have benefits. Social 
conflicts can be reduced, long-term contract 
compliance improves if participants perceive 
it as fair, and importantly, it can lead to political 
support and secure funding. However, win-win 
scenarios for equity, economic efficiency and 
environmental effectiveness are rare. Although 
Pfaff et al. (2008) find no conclusive evidence 
for losses or gains in efficiency from including the 
most vulnerable landowners in carbon projects in 
Costa Rica, more often the emphasis in national 
and international literature is on the trade-offs 
(Ferraro and Simpson, 2002; Grieg-Gran et al., 
2005; Zbinden and Lee, 2005). 
In cases like the Costa Rica PES programme, 
a high dependence on state funding makes the 
programme liable to government regulations on 
the use of public funds. This means ensuring 
social benefits – for instance demonstrating 
that public funds do not only go to the wealthier 
participants – and that the programme results 
in better quality of life for society in general. 
But it also brings stricter regulation linked to 
procurement, in terms of stricter requirements 
for participation that may limit the programme’s 
flexibility. For example, the requisites of having 
legal property titles, being up to date on taxes and 
social contributions, and having a property free of 
a mortgage are imposed by state regulations on 
the PES programme managers (see ‘boundary 
rules’ in Table 4, Section 3.5). Specifically, the 
programme is expected to benefit ‘small- and 
medium-sized producers’ and indigenous groups, 
under the assumption that these people are more 
vulnerable and in greater need of incentives. 
But foolproof indicators to identify small- and 
medium-sized producers are hard to find. The 
simplest indicator is property size, such as 
assigning additional points for properties with 
less than 50 hectares, as implemented since 
2012. But property size itself is not an indicator 
of vulnerability, or relative wealth, given the large 
26. Ecosystem functions are independent of people. Ecosystem services are measured in relation to how they impact 
people’s production and consumption functions. 
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disparities in land values throughout the country.27 
Asking directly about the household’s or legal 
entity’s income may be the most straightforward 
way to assess relative wealth, but field experience 
shows how difficult (though not impossible) it is 
to obtain reliable and comparable indicators of 
income. The process is further complicated by 
the participation of legal entities, like sociedades 
anónimas, that ‘hide’ the characteristics of those 
who ultimately own the land.28 
5.1 instruments for 
Promoting Positive sociaL 
imPacts
Three main instruments have been used 
by the PES programme so far to target 
their social impacts: assigning priority of 
participation to properties located in areas 
with a low development index (SDI); reducing 
transaction costs for landowners, improving 
outreach and using group contracts; and 
by encouraging smaller farms to participate 
through income diversification. We discuss the 
first two instruments here, and discuss income 
diversification in Section 5.2. 
5.1.1 Priority for areas with low social 
development 
The SDI is an indicator of relative wealth used by 
Costa Rican government institutions to establish 
priority for social policy and budget allocation 
(MIDEPLAN, 2007). Suggested initially by Ortiz 
et al. (2003) to improve the social impact of the 
scheme, it has been used by the PES programme 
since 2004. The SDI indicator was introduced 
to the programme to comply with the aims of 
Millennium Development Goals, and to prioritise 
PES assignment in territories with a low SDI, 
prioritising participants located in boroughs with 
an SDI of less than 40. The rational for using low 
SDI to target distribution of PES was roughly 
based on the following chain of expected impact: 
Priority of PES in areas with low SDI  increased 
participation of vulnerable farmers  increased 
income in poorer rural households 
There are at least three assumptions behind this 
relationship, which we discuss below: 
•	 Assumption 1: Lower SDI at the district level is 
linked to poverty.
•	 Assumption 2: There is a link between local 
levels of relative poverty measured by the SDI 
and farms that qualify to enter the PES.
•	 Assumption 3: Higher priority for PES in these 
areas will be captured by these relatively 
vulnerable landowners. 
Assumption 1: Lower SDI at the district level is 
linked to poverty. The SDI is centred around the 
concept of vulnerability and exclusion, resulting 
in unequal access to and distribution of wealth. 
It is a composite of 11 indicators grouped under 
the four main components of health, participation, 
economics and education (see Figure 6). Their 
relationship with wealth is described in detail in 
the MIDEPLAN document. For example, a higher 
27. For example, the average value of land in San Pablo de Heredia (near a metropolitan area) is US$120/m2, 
compared to Sierpe (remote rural area) where the average value is US$1/m2. Based on land values, a landowner with 
50 hectares in Heredia has property worth US$60million, compared to US$0.5 million for the owner of 50 hectares in 
Sierpe. Equal access in this case does not necessarily mean fairness in priority. 
28. One option is to assign extra points to Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs). However, this could exclude many 
small family properties registered as sociedades anónimas but not as SMEs.
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use of electricity and water corresponds to a 
higher number of devices (and therefore wealth) 
in the household. Access to the Internet, and 
therefore to information, is also linked to potential 
household wealth. The high levels of abstaining 
from electoral processes throughout the country 
make it difficult to establish links to wellbeing, but 
it is presumed that more motivated people (who 
feel better off) will be more likely to participate in 
the electoral process.
Urban areas, with better access to education, 
economic and health infrastructure, tend to have 
higher SDI scores than rural areas. The highest 
SDI scores are located in the centre of the 
country, around the capital area; the lowest are in 
the most remote parts of the country, especially 
along the border with Nicaragua and the Atlantic 
coast. There are notable exceptions. For example, 
the boom in the tourism industry, located mostly in 
rural areas especially along the Central and North 
Pacific coast, has led to an increase in electricity 
and water consumption which translates into 
higher SDI scores – though is not necessarily 
linked to higher wealth among local inhabitants. 
Assumption 2: Link between local levels of 
relative poverty measured by the SDI and farms 
that qualify to enter the PES. While wealth and 
land ownership are clearly related, the relationship 
figure 6. measurement of the sociaL deveLoPment index 
Residential drinking water
Birth single teenage mothers
Child mortality <5 years
Underweight children
School infrastructure
Special education programmes
Schools with only one teacher
Academic failure rate
Houses with internet access
Households electricity consumption
Electoral participation
Health
Education
Participation
Economic
Source: (MIDEPLAN, 2007)
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between the SDI components presented in Figure 
6 and landowners that qualify to enter the PES 
programme requires more analysis (landowners 
need a minimum of 1 hectare for agroforestry, 2 
for forest protection, and the average participating 
farm has 122 hectares).29 Owning land already 
gives an advantage of relative wealth compared 
to those who do not own land, and who 
proportionally make up the majority of informants 
for the levels of SDI at the community level. 
According to MIDEPLAN (2007) some indicators, 
like low weight in babies and pregnancies in 
single adolescent mothers, are far more closely 
linked to vulnerability in marginal urban areas than 
to farm owners in rural areas. Farm owners that 
qualify for PES would probably have, generally 
speaking, the financial ability to seek alternatives 
for their families, compared to those who do not 
qualify to participate in PES. 
Field studies of participants and non-participants 
in PES show that the first group is significantly 
better off than the second; and as Ortiz et al. 
(2003) report, the majority of PES participants 
across the country are not living in poverty 
or extreme poverty. The relative wealth of 
participants varies across regions. The study 
by Miranda et al. (2003) in the Virilla watershed 
surrounding the capital reports that almost 70 
per cent of participating households have a 
university degree. The study by Zbinden and Lee 
(2005) in Costa Rica’s central and northern areas 
report that participants of PES are consistently 
(relatively) wealthier than non-participants: they 
have considerably larger farms and substantially 
more years of education, as well as property titles; 
and about three quarters of participants in forest 
protection live away from the farm. The thesis 
by Muñoz-Calvo (2004) in the Osa Peninsula 
found lower levels of education in participating 
farmers, with 38 per cent not having completed 
primary education, but with an average farm 
size of 138 hectares. He highlights the high 
levels of social heterogeneity in the area, which 
includes peasants, indigenous communities, large 
landowners, and increasingly foreigners. 
Assumption 3: Higher priority in these areas will 
be captured by relatively vulnerable landowners. 
Since 1997, the PES programme has signed 
8,078 contracts (53 per cent of its total until 
2012) in areas with an SDI of less than 40, 
where it has also allocated 53 per cent of its 
budget (US$187 million). Nearly 20 per cent 
of the budget allocated in these areas goes to 
indigenous communities, bringing significant 
monetary benefits. Very little of the budget goes 
to contracts with cooperatives.30 The largest 
proportion of contracts are equally distributed 
between individuals and legal entities – 47 per 
cent each – with the latter also capturing nearly 
half of all budget allocations (48 per cent) in areas 
of social priority. Twenty-eight per cent of the 
budget goes to properties owned by individuals. 
In terms of property size (see Figure 7, which 
excludes indigenous groups and cooperatives), 
although 35 per cent of contracts are with 
relatively small properties (less than 30 hectares) 
this group only receives 7 per cent of budget 
allocations. But the priority criteria seems to 
benefit larger properties primarily; those over 
100 hectares represent 29 per cent of contract 
allocation and take 65 per cent of the budget. 
This analysis suggests that the SDI is biased and 
too spatially coarse to represent the social impact 
of the programme at household level. Ideally, 
priority should be given on the basis of people’s 
characteristics, such as belonging to indigenous 
groups, gender, income, or land value; or at least 
a more filtered indicator that combines low SDI 
and small property size, with larger properties not 
being prioritised even if they are located in low 
SDI areas. 
5.1.2 Reducing overall transaction costs
Another strategy to improve social outcomes and 
programme efficiency (see further discussion in 
Section 6) is to reduce transaction costs. The 
PES contracts incur two types of transaction 
costs: (i) those incurred by FONAFIFO and other 
scheme actors, that may dissuade the scheme 
administrators from admitting small landowners 
(as this will increase the overall number of 
participants, costs of administration, and reduce 
economies of scale); (ii) those directly incurred by 
the participants and which may discourage them 
from participating in the scheme (Pagiola et al., 
2005). 
Legrand et al. (2013) claim that by 2008, 
FONAFIFO’s transformation into a conventional 
public institution resulted in the increase of 
transaction costs reaching 12 per cent of the 
29. Average size of participating farms for all observations between 1997–2012, excluding contracts with indigenous 
groups. 
30. Most PES contracts with cooperatives (70 per cent) are in areas with an SDI greater than 40.
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figure 7. distribution of Pes contracts and budget by ProPerty size in 
areas with sdi<40
Note: excludes contracts with indigenous groups, cooperatives and associations; total observations 7,619. 
Source: Authors’ own, using data supplied by FONAFIFO
budget in 2008, according to FONAFIFO in a 
2011 interview. From 2010 to 2012, FONAFIFO 
reports that its annual budget was between 
US$29 and 35 million per year, of which 
approximately 80 per cent was transferred to 
farmers via the PES and 20 per cent kept for 
administrative costs (see Figure 8). It is unclear 
whether different accounting methods explain 
the difference with Legrand et al.’s estimates 
(2013), or whether administration costs are 
rising – the recent move of central offices to a 
different building may have contributed to higher 
administration costs. Administration activities 
include the costs of revision and correction of 
applications, and the monitoring and release of 
payments. Automating some of the processes 
and linking directly to other public institutions, for 
example to double check validity of land titles for 
instance, has substantially reduced the time and 
costs of recovering information. 
The PES transaction costs that fall on farmers are 
the greatest obstacle to the participation of more 
vulnerable farmers in developing countries (Grieg-
Gran et al., 2005; Pagiola et al., 2005; Villanueva 
et al., 2011; Rugtveit et al., forthcoming).  
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In Costa Rica the overall application process31 
can be lengthy and tedious, especially for those 
who are not familiar with the procedure; and 
technical information is detailed and expensive. 
Some of the participation requirements exclude 
the most vulnerable landowners. For example, 
people receiving social benefits such as housing 
allowance, or those with mortgages, either 
cannot participate in the scheme or find it very 
difficult (Miranda et al., 2004). Fixed costs are 
high – digital GIS landuse maps of the property 
must be provided by the applicant irrespective 
of the size of the contract. Historically, this has 
been a barrier to small landowners and small 
agroforestry projects (Rodríguez, 2008; Zbinden 
and Lee, 2005), emphasising the importance of 
the ‘regente forestals’ (forest engineers) role as 
facilitator for small property holders in particular. 
Uncontested land titles are a major problem for 
participation. A recent International Development 
Bank (IDB) cadastre project uncovered a large 
number of inconsistencies between cadastral 
maps (official property register maps) and 
registered properties (title deeds). Possession 
rights have been accepted on and off during the 
lifetime of the programme, but in practice it is 
difficult for owners of unregistered properties to 
provide a clear demonstration of uncontested 
possession rights – resulting in a de facto barrier 
to these properties. 
Rugtveit et al. (forthcoming) quantified transaction 
and compliance costs as a percentage for the 
payments received for the ‘forest protection’ 
and ‘reforestation’ modalities in the Nicoya 
Peninsula for PES participants. They found 
that reforestation contracts have on average 
transaction and compliance costs of 91.8 per cent 
of the total payment, suggesting that payments for 
reforestation are well calibrated as compensation 
for the costs of participation. Transaction and 
compliance costs of forest protection contracts 
were on average 24.2 per cent of the PES 
payment, suggesting higher levels of profit than 
for reforestation. 
FONAFIFO has tried to reduce some of these 
costs by eliminating superfluous requirements, 
and by giving more attention to the local level. 
figure 8. budget aLLocation within fonafifo, 2010–2012
Source: Authors’ own, using data supplied by Sanchez (2012)
31. Every year FONAFIFO publishes a procedural manual indicating priority areas, individual and or group 
requirements and so on, in its official bulletin la Gaceta Oficial.
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Apart from FONAFIFO, there are a number 
of intermediaries who provide services to 
participating actors for a commission or 
fee (usually between 12 and 18 per cent of 
payment) – for example, NGOs FUNDECOR and 
CODEFORSA and small farmer cooperatives 
that promote the use of PES. These services 
include managing applications, and preparing 
forest management plans. But due to economies 
of scale, many facilitators prefer to work with 
larger participants to get a larger percentage 
as commission.
Group contracts were used successfully to 
distribute payments in the early years of the PES 
programme (between 1997 and 2002), especially 
for small farmers (Ortiz et al., 2003). However, 
these contracts were discontinued in 2002, due 
in part to the facilitators inexperience in managing 
them and in part due to the contracts’ design: 
the noncompliance of one participant would 
automatically invalidate the whole contract for the 
rest of the group. Opening local offices filled a 
gap left by the group contracts, helping to reduce 
transaction costs, improve access to information 
and increase individuals’ participation in the 
scheme (Porras 2010; Robalino et al., 2011). The 
scheme has now reintroduced group contracts 
for technical assistance, but each contract is 
signed individually to avoid the problems with the 
previous contracts. 
5.2 direct imPacts on 
ParticiPants’ income 
Here we discuss how payments impact directly 
on participants’ income, with special attention to 
how the PES budget is distributed across types 
of participants (introduced in Section 3.3) and 
property sizes. We also discuss the programme’s 
impact in helping to diversify livelihoods through 
the introduction of agroforestry contracts. 
5.2.1 A direct, stable source of cash 
The US$340 million distributed between 1997 
and 2012 is probably the PES’s greatest direct 
socio-economic benefit. These relatively stable 
periodic payments are an important income 
source which diversifies participants’ livelihood 
opportunities, so that revenue comes from the 
provision of ecosystem services from forests 
as well as from agriculture. The direct impact is 
highest in remote rural areas, where PES is one of 
the principal sources of cash for many participants 
and a source for income diversification within 
the farm or group and redistribution within the 
local communities (for example in cooperatives 
or indigenous associations). The significance of 
PES as proportion of household income is less 
in properties nearer to urban areas, where many 
landowners do not derive their principal income 
from their farms (Miranda et al., 2003). However, 
access to and distribution of these funds has 
been heavily dependent on the type of participant 
and their relative wealth, which we discuss in the 
following sections. 
Access and funding distribution by type of 
participant 
The types of participants have varied enormously 
since the beginning of the scheme in 1997, 
when 44 per cent of the funds were allocated to 
cooperatives and/or associations. Funding for 
individuals and legal entities were roughly equally 
distributed (26 and 27 per cent respectively), and 
indigenous groups received only 3 per cent of 
funding. By 2012, almost half of the funds were 
allocated to legal entities; indigenous groups 
significantly increased their share of the funds; 
funding allocated to cooperatives significantly 
decreased (possibly suggesting a general shift 
from cooperatives to legal entities), and the 
proportion of individuals roughly remained the 
same (see Figure 9 and Figure 10). 
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figure 9. distribution of funds by tyPe of ParticiPant in 1997 and 2012 
Source: Authors’ own, using data supplied by FONAFIFO
figure 10. timeLine of funds by tyPe of ParticiPant, 1997–2012
Source: Authors’ own, using data supplied by FONAFIFO
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One particular area of positive social impact for 
the PES is its involvement of indigenous groups: 
fund allocation to indigenous people grew from 
3 to 26 per cent between 1997 and 2012. These 
territories make up the largest areas of forest 
cover in Costa Rica outside PAs (Sucre, 2012) 
and are increasingly involved in decision-making 
processes regarding forests. They stand to play 
an even more significant role in future PES and 
REDD+ negotiations seeking protection for 
large forest areas. The increased participation of 
these indigenous territories has provoked mixed 
reactions. Their low opportunity cost (there are 
few alternative income sources to PES for these 
indigenous groups) suggests potential gains in 
efficiency; but their minimal risk of deforestation 
also suggests low levels of additionality. Injections 
of cash from PES are undoubtedly important for 
local communities, but there are also concerns 
about potential negative impacts of the so-
called ‘cash for nature’ schemes on indigenous 
communities, not only in Costa Rica but in the rest 
of Latin America. 
However, from the social point of view, PES has 
generated important benefits for indigenous 
communities in Costa Rica. Although the 
transparency of payment distribution methods 
within indigenous groups has been questioned 
(Meland-Rød, 2010), it is unquestionable that the 
programme is a major source of income for these 
communities – which has helped them diversify 
their economic activities, invest in education 
and local infrastructure, and strengthen local 
institutions (Borge and Martinez, 2009; see Box 
3). Sharing experiences with other indigenous 
groups in Mexico and Brazil, like the Bolsa 
Floresta carbon scheme – as well as a more 
targeted approach to local capacity building and 
contract management – could help improve PES’s 
social outcomes (Borge and Martinez, 2009). 
The increasing participation of legal entities partly 
reflects a general shift in the way properties are 
registered in Costa Rica; there are benefits to 
being registered as a limited liability entity, for 
instance, and this legal form offers anonymity. 
Legal entities dominate the distribution of 
payments for reforestation (74 per cent), which 
partly reflects their ability to invest in technologies 
and co-funding to guarantee the long-term 
viability of their forest plantations. It is important 
however to understand what is behind the 
changing pattern in the types of the participants 
in the PES programme – whether it is due to the 
natural evolution of property titling in the country, 
or if this happens at the expense of less wealthy 
landowners (for example, small-scale farmers 
in cooperatives) who are not able to access 
payments or lack the capacity to manage them. 
The anonymity of legal entities as participants32 
also makes it hard to assess the social impact of 
the PES programme – its real impact on people is 
obscured by the legal anonymity. 
Access and funding distribution by property 
size 
One of the weaker aspects of the programme’s 
social impacts is its de facto bias towards 
relatively better-off landowners. Various studies 
report that payments tend to go disproportionately 
to landowners with higher levels of education, 
income, and with relatively large farms and 
diversified income, the majority of whom are not 
dependent on farming (for example, Miranda et 
al., 2003; Zbinden and Lee, 2005). Excluding 
32. Increasingly, contracts are signed using only the entity’s registry number (e.g. 3-102-515946 S.R.L.), further 
obscuring information on whether it is a family business, cooperative, not-for-profit association, real estate investors, or 
a transnational. 
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indigenous and group contracts, the average 
property size participating in the PES programme 
between 1997 and 2012 was approximately 115 
hectares, with an average size of a little over 70 
hectares for individuals, and 160 hectares for 
legal entities. Matulis (2012) attributes this bias 
towards large landowners to the fixed cost of 
transaction and monitoring incurred by regente 
forestales who act as intermediaries. 
Larger farms of between 100 and 300 hectares 
held the greatest share in number of contracts 
and proportion of the whole PES budget (26 and 
49 per cent respectively). Smaller properties (less 
than 30 hectares) have an increasing proportion 
since the introduction of agroforestry contracts 
(34 per cent of all contracts), but their share in the 
budget remains low (7 per cent). Contracts with 
larger farms of more than 300 hectares are less 
common (5 per cent) but they hold a substantial 
share of the funds distributed at 19 per cent – see 
Figure 11. 
Figure 11 shows the share in budget and number 
of contracts by property size, in terms of the 
programme’s three main stages (1997–2002; 
2003–10; and 2011–13), presented earlier in 
section 3. Properties of over 100 hectares take 
the majority, although they have a decreasing 
proportion of the budget allocation (77 per cent, 
68 per cent, and 61 per cent respectively) and 
therefore a lower proportion of contracts (44 per 
cent, 30 per cent and 24 per cent respectively). 
Participation of small properties has been on the 
rise throughout the three periods, representing 21 
per cent, 36 per cent and 41 per cent of contract 
allocation, and modest but increasing budget 
shares of 3 per cent, 7 per cent and 9 per cent 
respectively. Medium-size properties (30 to less 
than 100 hectares) remain roughly unchanged at 
35 per cent of contract allocation throughout the 
period, although a concentration on the smaller 
box 3. indigenous women and 
Pes: acomuita in taLamanca
ACOMUITA is an indigenous association 
with 70 women members, mostly heads of 
households, from the Bribri and Cabecar 
communities. According to Justa Romero, 
leader of ACOMUITA, entering into PES 
and carbon projects required a lot of 
discussion within the community. Initially 
people thought the government was trying 
to expropriate the land. Other people 
within the community thought it was an 
opportunity for them to grab communal 
forests. After a lot of discussion and 
clarification of concepts and roles they 
decided to fully engage in the programme. 
The money from PES is used to complement 
community projects. ACOMUITA’s activities 
include improving agricultural practices, 
developing manufacturing techniques, 
and enhancing their commercialisation of 
cocoa products. PES supports the social 
structure of the community and promotes 
the work of different base organisations, 
as well as supporting infrastructure like 
rural water services, hanging bridges and 
scholarships to young people. To date, 
there are many benefits. According to 
Romero, the main problem with PES stems 
from the uncertainty of long-term funds. 
But the association is trying to weave this 
PES money into their activities, promoting 
activities that will be self-sustainable in the 
long term, reducing their dependency on 
future payments. 
Source: Justa Romero, in Porras (2013)
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figure 11. share of budget and number of contracts by farm size and 
main Period 
Note: excludes group contracts and those with indigenous groups. 
Source: Authors’ own, using data supplied by FONAFIFO
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end of this range is discernible, but their share of 
the budget has increased (19 per cent, 25 per 
cent and 30 per cent). The programme has been 
effective in increasing participation of smaller-
sized properties over time, even if their share 
of the budget is still relatively small; and it has 
continued to be effective at engaging with small- 
and medium-scale landowners. 
Most of the budget allocated to smaller farms 
(less than 30 hectares) goes to those belonging 
to individuals. The distribution of the budget to 
individuals and legal entities is equally distributed 
for medium-sized farms, but the greater 
proportion of the budget allocated to larger 
farms is captured by legal entities (clearly shown 
in Figure 12). The majority of payments for very 
small farms (less than 5 hectares) are captured 
by individuals in agroforestry and reforestation 
contracts. Payments in very large farms (1000 to 
2000 hectares) go mostly for forest protection 
and reforestation.
5.2.2 Encouraging income diversification in 
small farms through agroforestry
The bulk of PES contracts are for forest 
protection, many of which are farms with a high 
proportion of forest cover (see for example 
Zbinden and Lee, 2005), which has restricted 
landowners from carrying out income-generating 
activities. This discouraged potential participants 
who either did not have large properties already 
covered in forest, did not want or could not afford 
to dedicate large tracts of their land to forest alone 
(Miranda et al., 2003, Porras and Bruijnzeel 2006, 
Casasola et al., 2009, Ibrahim et al., 2010). 
FONAFIFO responded by introducing 
agroforestry contracts, which have proved 
very popular and increased the participation of 
smaller properties (see Figure 13). For example, 
contracts with farms of less than 10 hectares have 
increased from 15 in 1997 to 276 in 2012, with 82 
per cent under individual ownership (rather than 
legal entities). Co-funding from soft loans and 
technical assistance have also been important 
instruments to promote participation and benefits 
for small-scale landowners. 
The money obtained through the PES is 
regarded as a crucial co-investment for activities 
like reforestation, forest management and 
agroforestry, and promotes the economic 
attraction of forest activities (Morse et al., 2009). 
figure 12. share of budget by LegaL entities and individuaLs by farm size 
Note: SA = sociedades anónimas, legal entities, roughly equivalent to public limited companies. 
Source: Authors’ own, using data supplied by FONAFIFO
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5.3 indirect socio-economic 
imPacts 
According to Ross et al. (2007) the 
macroeconomic impact of the PES scheme has 
been modest. However, much remains to be 
investigated; its direct effects on family and small 
business incomes, indirect effects on the tourism 
industry, and the influence of various ecosystem 
services (water quality for example) on quality of 
life in general. Apart from an initial study by Ortiz 
et al. (2003) there has been no comprehensive 
study of the social impact of PES, taking into 
account control groups and/or a nationwide 
analysis. Ross et al. (2007) propose the use of 
new techniques for the valuation of non-market 
benefits and for securing market feedback in 
figure 13. ParticiPation of smaLL farms (Less than 10 hectares) 
Note: ‘other activity’ refers to all the other PES activities, although conservation is the largest share of this ‘other’. 
Source: Authors’ own, using data supplied by FONAFIFO
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hypothetical simulations of conservation policies 
on a large scale. In the absence of such studies, 
the analysis below describes the results of 
specific studies and our own analysis of existing 
distribution of the PES programme funds. 
5.3.1 Impacts on jobs
From individual studies we find that outside 
indigenous areas in Costa Rica, PES have 
shown a modest impact on the supply chain by 
generating jobs, promoting infrastructure and 
microbusinesses for the timber industry through 
PES for reforestation (Miranda et al., 2004, 
Tacconi et al., 2010), and of the ecotourism 
industry through PES for forest protection – 
where they provide a stable flow of income 
that helps to counterbalance the fluctuations 
of ecotourism markets. On the other hand, 
potential negative impacts in jobs can take place 
if forest protection results in the abandonment of 
agricultural lands that could have generated jobs 
(Porras et al., 2008). Zbinden and Lee (2005), for 
example, report that farms that do not participate 
in PES have a greater number of farm workers 
than those participating in forest protection, which 
is to be expected since economic activities are 
not allowed under forest protection contracts. 
There has still not been a rigorous evaluation 
of intangible benefits such as perceptions of 
the scheme, community and group relations, 
or perceptions of justice. There are, however, 
studies that stress how these benefits may be 
key to securing participation, even (or perhaps 
especially) when the scheme does not totally 
compensate for opportunity costs (Blackman and 
Woodward, 2010). 
5.3.2 Cross-compliance: PES as incentive for 
land tenure security
Sorting out possession or tenure rights is one of 
the most important benefits of the PES scheme 
(Locatelli et al., 2008; Porras, 2010). Barton et al. 
(2013) discuss PES’s indirect benefits in terms 
of cross-compliance with other policy objectives. 
The PES Operations Manual (FONAFIFO, 2009) 
specifies legal conditions that must be met 
regarding property titles: they must be correctly 
registered in the National Register (i.e. the title 
deeds) and consistent with the national property 
cadastre (i.e. the property map), which is currently 
under development. A number of cadastral 
inconsistencies can delay or disqualify PES 
applications (see Table 9). A study carried out in 
the PESILA-REDD project using IDB cadastre 
project data from the Osa Peninsular biological 
corridor found that more than 42 per cent of 
properties, covering 70.5 per cent of the land 
area, were affected by ‘cadastral inconsistencies’ 
which would limit applicant access to PES. The 
criteria for determining significant inconsistencies 
in terms of PES application procedure are 
given in Table 3. The Operations Manual 
provides detailed information on grace periods 
for obtaining necessary documentation to 
resume the application process (information 
rules). Applicants may also qualify if they can 
document possession rights, but the process 
of documentation and obtaining witnesses is 
laborious. Smallholder applicants may choose to 
pay surveyor and legal services to obtain a formal 
title, sometimes borrowing money in informal 
credit markets against the first PES payment 
(Porras et al., 2012). It could be argued that 
PES is a hybrid, or policymix instrument if tenure 
regularisation is ascribed as one of its formal 
objectives. FONAFIFO personnel argue that PES 
is an effective tool for land tenure regularisation 
(Sánchez, 2012). How important PES is for 
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tabLe 9. understanding tenure security - do ‘cadastraL inconsistencies’ 
affect Pes targeting?
situation cadastraL 
inconsistency
imPLications for Pes aPPLicants
 1 Plot without property map or 
register information
Cost; time to obtain property map and register 
may exceed PES annual application deadlines
 2 Plot defined by ‘posession’ 
information rather than official title
None. Follow procedure in PES Operation 
Manual to quality for PES
 3 Property registered without 
property map
Cost; time to obtain property map may exceed 
PES annual aplication deadlines
 4 Difference due to larger property 
size relative to register (>10%)
Cost and time for a process of possession on 
any excess area
 5 Discrepancies in registered 
information
None. Follow simple procedure for rectification 
of register information
 6 Physical overlapping boundary 
lines of registered property
Subject to negotiation between neighbours – at 
least one of the affected parties must make a 
new property map and rectify register information
 7 Apparent overlapping boundary 
linesof registered property with 
public property (public roads, 
Coastal Maritime Zone)
Cost and time to make a new property map
 8 Property registered with different 
property map
Simple modification of register information if 
another property map exists; or cost and time to 
make a new property map
 9 Property registered in a different 
district
None. Follow simple procedure for rectification 
of register information
10 Two or more property boundaries 
not identified
Cost and time to make a new property map and 
negotiation between neighbours
11 Map incompatibile with physical 
reality
Cost and time to make a new property map and 
negotiation between neighbours
Note. Red indicates situation where the cadastral inconsistency results in additional costs for the PES participants. 
Source: interpretation by Benavides (2013).
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tenure regularisation depends on the causes of 
tenure insecurity. For example, there are a number 
of areas in Costa Rica where the agricultural 
development institute (IDA) has given possession 
titles to smallholders for land which has been 
officially described as indigenous reserves or 
forest reserves (Miranda, 2013). The outcomes 
from these institutional clashes are emerging. 
Anecdotal reports suggest that landowners have 
recently had problems renewing PES contracts in 
areas previously enrolled, but now find themselves 
in ambiguous land tenure situation where their 
land is now argued to be state patrimony (pers.
com. Garro Arroyo, 2012). 
5.3.3 Cross-compliance: PES as an incentive 
for social security and tax compliance 
Another example of cross-compliance which has 
not been well documented is the requirement 
that PES participants have no outstanding 
debts with the national social security system 
(FONAFIFO, 2009). This is a direct example of 
cross-compliance designed to guarantee that 
farm employees have access to social security 
financed health services. Another example of 
unintended cross-compliance may be land 
taxation. Although land under PES is exempt from 
property tax, a long-term effect of PES-driven 
tenure regularisation may be an increase in the 
tax base once properties leave the PES scheme. 
This remains to be studied in depth (Barton 
et al., 2013).
5.3.4 Impacts on gender 
Of all PES contracts with individuals (rather than 
legal entities or associations), 28 per cent are with 
women (1988 contracts). Of these, 1,094 (55 per 
cent) are located in relatively vulnerable parts of 
the country – boroughs with a SDI of less than 40. 
Female-headed properties are small to medium 
size, 66 hectares on average, with 46 per cent 
properties being less than 30 hectares. Figure 
14 shows how female participation has increased 
in the programme, despite initial low levels of 
participation reported by Ortiz et al. (2003). 
Although not a national-level strategy, projects 
like Ecomarkets give priority to women. However, 
measuring gender in the PES programme is 
difficult. Culturally, in Costa Rica, land ownership 
is assigned to a male member of the household, 
which tends to skew statistics. More importantly, 
personal indicators like ‘gender of landowner’ 
are hidden when properties are registered as 
companies, associations, cooperatives or those 
with indigenous communities, which increasingly 
take the largest share of the contracts. 
5.4 summary
In summary, the PES programme has created an 
opportunity for smaller properties to participate 
with the introduction of agroforestry contracts, 
and has significantly increased the participation 
of indigenous communities and female-headed 
households. The SDI has limited usefulness for 
assigning priority to PES applications. With only 
a few exceptions, like indigenous areas, low SDI 
scores are not likely to represent those who are 
actually eligible to participate in the PES. And of 
those who have benefited from the social priority 
criteria of an SDI below 40 to access PES, a 
significant amount of funds are being captured by 
relatively large farms. This suggests that although 
some small and potentially vulnerable landowners 
have benefited from priority access, given the low 
SDI in their area, the principal beneficiaries of the 
social priority criteria have been relatively large 
landowners. Up to 2012, a significant proportion 
of the PES programme was captured by larger 
properties, many of them increasingly held by 
legal entities. Whether this fulfils the programme’s 
mandate to support small- and medium-scale 
farmers is debatable. While not all legal entities 
are necessarily wealthy, and many of them are 
family enterprises, it is still likely that the owners 
of legal entities in PES are, on average, wealthier 
than individual PES contract holders, given the 
high legal costs of keeping a private company up 
to date (Viquez, 2013).33 On the other hand, it is 
also possible that legal entities are better placed 
to invest in improved management techniques 
for reforestation, regeneration, and forest 
management, as well as having a better grasp 
of marketing which increases the chances of 
reinforcing the attractiveness of forestry activities 
and the creation of more jobs. More information 
is required to understand how to promote 
participation of one group without negatively 
affecting access by another. 
33. Registering a property as a sociedad anónima has advantages in terms of tax-breaks, resale process, legal liability, 
etc. However, it incurs relatively high legal expenses compared to individual land ownership. According to Viquez 
(2013; a local notary with land expertise), although the trend is slowly changing in more rural settings, cash-strapped 
farmers still register land under their own names. 
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Although the PES programme is not specifically a 
poverty-alleviation tool, it has social and economic 
obligations to fulfil, as required by law. The 
programme is continually presented nationally 
as an instrument to promote rural development 
and redistribution of wealth. Using an appropriate 
theory of change, it is important to define what 
the likely socio-economic impacts from PES are, 
such as increased income or more jobs; how 
to address participatory justice by specifically 
targeting providers of ecosystem services who 
need support, for example more vulnerable 
farmers or indigenous groups; and what 
indicators to use to evaluate who wins and who 
loses, such as income at farm level, or aggregate 
district data (see Grieg-Gran et al., 2013). 
figure 14. ParticiPation of femaLe-headed househoLds in Pes (1997–2012)
Note: observations only include contracts with individuals, where gender of the landowner is reported. Total valid observations: 
7,175, of which 1,989 were signed with females; and 3,816 individual contracts of which 1,094 were signed by women. 
Source: Authors’ own, using data supplied by FONAFIFO
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6.1 sPatiaL targeting of key 
ecosystems 
One of the main concerns about landowners’ 
voluntary participation in PES is the quality of 
forests enrolled in the programme. Although 
potentially cheaper than establishing PAs (World 
Bank, 2000), there is no guarantee that PES will 
protect forests that are more at risk. The short-
term nature of contracts34 is also a problem. While 
it satisfies farmers’ desire to enter and exit the 
programme within a reasonable period of time, it 
clashes with the long-term ideal for biodiversity 
conservation. A purely voluntary approach does 
not necessarily create the continuous blocks of 
protected forest necessary to provide biological 
corridors, buffer zones to protect key water 
sources, roaming space for large animals like 
jaguars, or forest on slopes that help reduce the 
risk of flooding (see for example Bradshaw et 
al., 2007). This can only be achieved by spatial 
targeting, where the PES takes the initiative to 
prioritise areas it deems to be a conservation 
priority, through engaging with landowners or 
providing special incentives.
Spatial targeting using a landscape approach 
allows programme managers to determine 
what investments will be required to provide the 
ecosystem service. This will result in different 
costs for conservation or for the adoption of 
practices, depending on the actual ecosystem 
service provided – whether carbon sequestration, 
water protection, biodiversity conservation or 
natural beauty. A more narrow focus on the 
ecosystem service – such as biodiversity, 
rather than just forest cover – could lead to a 
more varied mosaic of land uses that provide 
positive outcomes, including agroforestry and 
silvopastoral systems (Rapidel et al., 2011). 
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It is difficult to make decisions that balance 
environmental effectiveness and positive social 
impacts, while ensuring that a programme 
continues to be manageable. The country is 
running out of ‘cheap’ conservation (e.g. in areas 
with low opportunity costs) and there is a need to 
look into non-conventional management systems 
beyond forest conservation while offering value 
for money.
In order to better understand the ‘value for money’ 
aspect of the programme, this section is divided 
in three: 
1. Approaches to increase environmental 
effectiveness through spatial targeting, which 
builds on Section 4. 
2. Opportunity costs of participation, which builds 
on previous discussions on how landowners’ 
characteristics affect potential programme 
effectiveness. 
3. Differentiated payments to increase cost-
effectiveness. 
Policy makers are continuously under pressure 
to produce value for money (introducing auctions 
for example – see Box 5). Nevertheless, a 
focus on cost-effectiveness alone needs to be 
treated carefully, with particular attention to the 
effects of the voluntary nature of participation. If 
payments are geared towards lower opportunity 
costs (Sierra and Russman, 2006), focusing 
on the number of hectares may not necessarily 
correspond to areas at risk, or take into account 
issues of distribution and fairness that can be very 
important in a programme of this nature. 
34. FONAFIFO has in recent years increased contract length from 5 to 10 year contracts for conservation. 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
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Spatial targeting can be done by directing 
the payments towards areas more likely to 
generate ecosystem services. For the Costa 
Rican PES these areas have been selected 
following a rigorous consultation that defined the 
conservation gaps and priorities for conservation 
strategies outlined in Section 2.2. Although 
enrolment in the programme continues to be 
voluntary, the introduction of the priority matrix 
is expected to result in better spatial targeting. 
The priority matrix awards higher points to forest 
protection applications located in pre-selected 
areas, such as forests in conservation gaps, 
biological corridors, indigenous territories and 
those located around important water sources 
(see Table 3 in Section 3.4). 
It is still too early to evaluate whether higher 
points result in more contracts allocated in the 
areas of geographic interest, and if this improves 
the provision of ecosystem services. However, 
it is expected that this approach will generate 
better outcomes than the first-come, first-served 
system used in the early years of the programme. 
Barton et al. (2009) found that spatial targeting 
criteria in the ACOSA improved biodiversity 
complementarity of PES contracts relative to the 
early first-come-first-served approach. Better 
new technology, like satellite imagery with higher 
resolution and GPS at farm-level monitoring, 
will also facilitate targeting and pursuing better 
ecosystem outcomes. For example, Estrada and 
DeClerck (2011) used aerial photos and other 
methods to show how to best identify sites that 
contribute to a higher reduction of sediments 
(as well as biodiversity protection) around 
hydroelectric projects, which can then be used to 
target actions at watershed level. 
Modelling can also help improve ecosystem 
outcomes. The study by Barton et al. (2009) in 
the Osa Conservation Area (see Box 4) used 
biodiversity complementary and opportunity costs 
as allocation criteria for contract distribution, and 
found that the cost-efficiency of the programme 
could be significantly improved. The study by 
Wünscher et al. (2007) in the Guanacaste 
area highlights the efficiency gains (between 
58 to 88 per cent) that could be achieved by 
targeting payments to landowners based on both 
service provision (by ranking each parcel’s total 
ecosystem services’ score) and the opportunity 
cost of service provision. 
Although it is difficult to see the immediate viability 
of these data-intense approaches, they highlight 
the importance of understanding how local 
characteristics affect programme participation. A 
purely geographical approach to prioritising areas 
does not guarantee that farmers living in these 
areas will participate. A better understanding of 
opportunity costs, and what affects the likelihood 
of forest conversion in the context of PES can help 
improve the programme design, moving towards 
a more tailormade suite of incentives that improve 
the quality and quantity of ecosystem services 
(Robalino et al., 2008). In the next section we 
discuss these issues in more depth.
6.2 oPPortunity costs of 
conservation and Pes 
ParticiPation 
In economics, the opportunity cost of an activity 
such as forest conservation is defined as the 
highest forgone profits of not putting the land 
under an available alternative (such as producing 
palm oil). These costs are spatially explicit, time-
specific, and are affected by a wide range of legal 
and market rules affecting choice (presented in 
Table 4). They are also affected by the methods 
chosen for economic valuation (Grieg-Gran, 
2008; Olsen and Bishop, 2009; see Table 10).
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Evaluation studies presented in Section 4 
show how impact heterogeneity is linked to 
land characteristics (such as location and 
size) and landowners’ characteristics (such 
as education). Understanding how PES varies 
between sub-groups of the population provides a 
better understanding of the opportunity costs of 
participating in PES. 
For our discussion, we focus on two factors 
affecting opportunity costs; regulations and rules, 
and profitability from alternative land uses:
a) Rules-in-use affecting forests. Table 4 
introduced, amongst others, the ‘choice rules’ 
allowing or forbidding actions at a particular time, 
and ‘pay-off rules’ including sanctions. Forest 
conservation is directly affected by the prohibition 
to change land use in established forests, with 
prison sanctions for those who break the law 
(Law 7575, art 19); the state’s right to expropriate 
private lands of high conservation importance 
(Law 7575, art 2); as well as passive regulation of 
buffer zones that restrict land use in and around 
natural springs, along rivers and streams, around 
lakes, and in recharge zones (Law 7575, art 33). 
For PES specifically, spatial priority-setting for 
the programme is set out by annual government 
decrees (Art. 22). 
b) Profitability of forest conservation in relation 
to other uses. Forest activities struggle to be 
economically attractive in some parts of the 
country. For example, an analysis of profitability of 
economic activities (including forest plantations) 
in the San Juan biological corridor in the north 
of Costa Rica shows how forestry plantations, 
even including PES services, find it difficult to 
compete with other economic activities if and 
when they are legally and technically viable 
(Pitacuar, 2010). For example, the rental value of 
a site suitable for export-grade pineapple is about 
US$390 per hectare per year, or could be sold 
for approximately US$5800/ha (Daniels et al., 
forthcoming); whereas PES conservation would 
earn US$65/ha/year. 
Alternative land uses go beyond agriculture, and 
any assessments of opportunity costs should 
include urbanisation and tourism. Uncontrolled 
urban expansion is currently one of the principal 
sources of pressure on forests in Costa Rica 
35. POLICYMIX: Assessing the role of economic instruments in a policy mix for biodiversity conservation and 
ecosystem services provision (2010–2014). FP7 European Union. http://policymix.nina.no. PESILA-REDD: Payments 
for Ecosystem Services in Latin America in the context of REDD integrating methods for evaluating the enabling 
conditions and cost-effectiveness of PES (2011–2014), Norwegian Research Council.
box 4. a ProPosaL for 
aLLocating conservation 
Priorities and evaLuating the 
Pes Programme
The projects POLICYMIX and PESILA-
REDD35 propose using the cadastral 
maps (which has been recently updated 
for most of the country) of the property 
as the basic unit of analysis. Property 
boundaries can be used as the basis 
upon which to evaluate the scheme 
and prioritise participation. Units of 
(registered) land are also used as the 
basis for the analysis of social and 
economic indicators. The main objective 
of the land register information system 
is to improve property taxation and 
tenure security. A collateral benefit is 
expected to be greater ease in prioritising 
the additionality of PES, necessary to 
comply with the carbon sequestration 
goals of a country’s strategy using a 
base year of reference (i.e. 2012) until 
the year 2030. GIS and conservation 
planning software is used with cadastral 
information together with criteria 
and weighs for prioritisation of PES 
applications (for example conservation 
gaps, wild PAs, biological corridors and 
protection of hydrological resources), 
social requirements (for example co-
benefits expected under REDD+, or legal 
regulations), and economic information 
(for example opportunity and transaction 
costs). Conservation planning 
models create simulations of possible 
distributions of PES contracts that 
maximise conservation objectives given 
the priority criteria described above. 
This spatial allocation may serve as the 
benchmark for the periodic definition of 
criteria and weightings to be used during 
the period of a strategic planning cycle 
(for example 5 years).
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(Hope et al. 2005; Daniels et al. 2010; Porras and 
Bruijnzeel, 2006). These pressures include:
•	 Sub-dividing larger farms into smaller units, 
making them easier to sell for recreational 
purposes at higher prices; this results in a more 
fragmented landscape, which is more difficult to 
manage for conservation purposes.
•	 Conversion of forest (e.g. to urban uses) and 
the potential negative impacts on ecosystem 
services, such as increased sediments in water, 
loss of biodiversity.
•	 Increase in solid wastes from uncontrolled 
urbanisation of rural areas. 
In Table 11 we attempt to summarise the 
relationship between landowners’ statutory rights 
to deforest, the associated conservation costs 
that need to be considered, and the potential role 
that a PES service may play in these situations. 
Gregersen et al. (2011) discuss the role of 
statutory rights in determining opportunity costs 
of conservation. For example, if landowners or 
users do not have the statutory right to deforest, 
the relevant conservation cost for the government 
should be that of improving the enforcement 
of the law (provided that it is feasible to do so). 
In this situation, if the profits from alternative 
economic activities are low (for example, the 
farm is in a remote location) then PES will be an 
attractive incentive.
But if landowners have a right to deforest, the 
associated conservation cost should be a 
direct market-based study of opportunity costs 
associated with alternative land uses – and it 
tabLe 10. variabLes affecting oPPortunity costs in forest conservation 
economic, sociaL and 
geograPhicaL/PhysicaL factors
methodoLogicaL considerations
•	 Regulations and laws affecting resource use
•	 Primary commodity prices and variations over 
time
•	 The suitability of particular forest lands for 
different uses
•	 Soil and climate conditions which affect yields 
and hence returns for agriculture
•	 Scale of operation – small, medium, large
•	 Inputs and technology
•	 Distance from market and the quality of 
transport infrastructure
•	 Measurement of timber harvesting and land 
clearing costs
•	 What type of forest land use is considered 
(protection, management, etc.)
•	 How alternative land uses are modelled
•	 Which carbon density estimates are used
•	 Whether cost curves or points for carbon 
abatement are estimated
•	 Differences in assumptions on discount rate 
and time horizon
•	 Differences in assumptions about the cost of 
labour, particularly family labour
Source: Grieg-Gran (2008)
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is highly likely that PES will not compete if the 
alternatives are highly profitable. However, PES 
may compete if the profitability of alternatives is 
low, or where landowners of secondary forest with 
some minimum threshold of off-farm income (or 
are absentee owners) are faced with the annual or 
semi-annual decision to clear early successional 
growth through burning and cutting. In cases 
like this, PES may help tip the balance toward 
securing forest regeneration. Without payments, 
the farmer will likely clear the forest or limit its 
growth to avoid future restrictions (e.g. prohibition 
to clear once the forest is established), or engage 
in the cultural practice of clear-cutting (Daniels et 
al., 2010). The current economic downturn may 
also work in favour of PES, making conservation 
more favourable following abandonment of urban 
and tourism development along coastal areas 
(Daniels et al., 2010). 
The situation is more complicated when the 
statutory rights are unclear or there is imperfect 
monitoring. Final decisions will be affected by 
the landowner or user’s perception of the costs 
(such as the gamble of deforesting and not being 
caught, which depends on how risk-averse the 
landowner is) and the government’s cost of 
monitoring and enforcement. In practice, the 
viability of any statutory rights is linked to the 
state’s capacity to enforce the regulation, the 
perceived risks of being caught, and if so, the 
severity of sanctions; as well as how exemptions 
to the forest prohibitions are understood.36 
According to Rodríguez and Obando (2012) 
illegal deforestation in Costa Rica is caused by 
the state’s poor capacity to clarify and enforce 
land titles, as well as to monitor illegal settlements, 
logging, hunting and mining. 
It is hard to see how PES can compete in areas 
that are rapidly changing to urban sites or to high-
value export crops, when the one-off profit from 
selling the land can be very high for the landowner 
– and PES is not likely to make a difference once 
tabLe 11. comParing the PotentiaL viabiLity of Pes in different scenarios
statutory rights to deforest
yes no uncertain
associated 
conservation 
cost
Opportunity costs of 
alternative land use
Costs of monitoring and 
enforcement
Perceived opportunity 
costs + costs of 
imperfect monitoring 
and enforcement
P
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it
s
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f 
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Lt
e
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e
 
a
c
t
iv
it
ie
s
high 
Profits
Areas suitable for 
pineapple production, 
for example: 
PES does not 
compete 
PES may help only if 
regulation is strongly 
enforced, but there will 
be high pressure for 
forest conversion. May 
require higher levels of 
payments
Uncertain. PES 
may not compete if 
perceived benefits are 
high compared to risks 
of detection
Low 
Profits
PES will help increase 
viability of conservation 
but higher PES levels 
may be required
PES highly 
competitive. Lower 
levels of payments may 
be acceptable
Uncertain – PES may 
help discourage illegal 
change; but pressure 
for change is low
Source: Authors’ own, based on Gregersen et al. (2011) and Barton et al. (2012)
36. The same article that prohibits conversion of existing forests also allows for many exemptions, including building 
homes, offices, stables, roads, and ecotourism projects. Ultimately, conversion of existing forest will take place if the 
landowner has the legal capacity to justify the proposed change. 
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the decision to sell has been made. In these 
cases, stricter regulations on infrastructure 
development are required, with PES added in as 
an extra bonus for those complying. 
6.3 targeting key 
ecosystems through 
differentiated Payments 
The point systems presented in Table 3 gives 
priority at the moment of contract allocation, but 
the payment levels remain the same across the 
country (as presented in Section 3.2). PES levels 
in Costa Rica are mostly fixed by hectare, with 
some small variations for forests located near 
water sources, or reforestation projects using 
native species. 
Accounting for ecosystem services is done 
through ‘bundling’. Each hectare of forest is 
assumed to provide the four ecosystem services 
(carbon sequestration, landscape beauty, 
biodiversity conservation and water protection) 
and each hectare of a specific landuse receives a 
fixed payment level. Recently, payment levels have 
been differentiated for ‘protection’ PES of forest in 
hydrologically important areas and conservation 
gaps; and for native species in ‘reforestation’ PES. 
This simple approach has advantages: it reflects 
the complementary nature of the ecosystem 
services, it bypasses the difficulty of measuring 
and monitoring individual ecosystem services, 
and it makes the system more manageable 
at the national level. There are also obvious 
shortcomings to the design and the following 
improvements have been suggested: 
•	 Differentiated payments that reflect the quality 
of the forest. For example, higher payments 
for ecosystems like ‘old growth’ forest that 
are poorly represented in the existing reserve 
system; and that provide higher levels of 
ecosystem services such as carbon storage 
than other types of forests (World Bank, 2006; 
Daniels et al., forthcoming). 
•	 Differentiated payments that reflect different 
opportunity costs. The principles of supply 
and demand suggests that the high volume 
of applications for payments each year would 
make a lower payment acceptable for many 
potential participants, especially those with 
lower opportunity costs and/or lower risk of 
deforestation (Sierra and Russman, 2006). 
Freeing up resources through lower payments in 
these areas would allow programme managers 
to raise the competitiveness of PES in areas 
where opportunity costs and/or the risk of 
deforestation are higher (Robalino et al., 2008). 
Raising the competitiveness of PES could be 
achieved through a mix of better targeting and 
enforcement of regulations regarding land use 
changes and higher PES services.
•	 Differentiated payments over time to incentivise 
long-term conservation. Daniels et al. 
(forthcoming) suggest considering different 
payment levels and contract time scales, 
differentiated over different term lengths with 
higher payment rates for longer contracts. 
This will make forest conservation more viable, 
even when market conditions make PES a 
less attractive use of land – especially for 
those landowners with a cultural and personal 
inclination to protect their forest. 
•	 Differentiated payments through auctions. 
Designing differentiated payments based on 
opportunity costs may be technically difficult. 
One way to overcome this is through ‘reverse 
auctioning’ with confidential bidding, where 
potential landowners confidentially submit 
the price they would accept to enrol in the 
PES programme (Daniels et al., forthcoming). 
The individual prices will reveal their personal 
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opportunity costs. The buyer then accepts bids, 
up to a budget threshold, service provision level, 
or cost-benefit ratio. In theory, reverse auctions 
can prevent collusion and bidding up of prices 
among landowners; it can reduce, though 
not eliminate, rent-seeking by reducing the 
inequality of information between the ecosystem 
service provider and buyer. They have been 
used in several countries (see for example 
Box 5). But there is a danger that because of 
differences in small and large farmers ability to 
participate in the more sophisticated auction 
process it could exacerbate the already 
unequal distribution among social groups (as 
discussed in Section 5). A possible solution 
would be to continue to offer low transaction 
cost fixed payment PES to small-to medium-
sized properties (below a certain size), while 
requiring auctions for properties above a certain 
size. This would mean that authorities would 
seek to minimize contracting costs – and shift 
rents from the landowner to the state – only on 
properties with wealthier owners. 
The relative merits of different approaches for 
spatial differentiation of payments compared 
to the current uniform system have to be 
balanced against the relative transaction costs 
of the different approaches. So far, programme 
managers have not opted for differentiated 
payments, primarily on the grounds of 
transparency and fairness. For example, the 
risk of collusion from large, well-connected 
landowners in an auction setting could result in 
even higher payment levels that will unbalance 
the programme’s coffers. Although there 
are no studies comparing the advantages of 
differentiated payments for Costa Rica, an 
economic study of payment models in Mexico 
shows that flexible or differentiated payments 
that take into account the risk of deforestation 
are the most effective from an environmental 
perspective (Alix-Garcia et al., 2008). They show 
that fixed payments lead to a more equitable 
distribution of funds between cooperative groups 
(ejidos) of different sizes and levels of poverty, but 
differentiated payments can increase the benefits 
for the poorest groups. It would be interesting 
to see whether the higher points proposed in 
the current system will be enough to promote 
participation in priority areas, without changing 
payment levels or entering a new auction system.
 
box 5. auctions of Pes for 
conservation
The United States Conservation Reserve 
Programme (CRP) is a useful example 
of the relationship between cost-
effectiveness and opportunity costs. 
The programme encourages farmers to 
convert highly erodible cropland, or other 
environmentally sensitive acreage, to 
vegetative cover. Individual opportunity 
costs are ‘revealed’ by the participants, by 
way of auction. Payments for conservation 
are made on the basis of farmers’ 
proposals, which must satisfy specific 
landowner and land requirements. Studies 
show that in comparison with a system of 
fixed payments (as is the case of the PES 
in Costa Rica), this auction-based system 
limits the possibility of farm owners 
earning excessive rents, and maximises 
the benefits per dollar invested (Baylis et 
al., 2008). Auctions can be useful when 
there are no studies of opportunity costs, 
although there are additional transaction 
costs associated with organising an 
auction. For Costa Rica, Sierra and 
Russman (2006) and Barton et al. (2009) 
recommend the use of spatial models 
and economic and ecological indicators 
in order to optimise the PES levels and 
contract offers, through a combination of 
environmental spatial prioritisation with 
auction mechanisms. 
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This section is divided in two parts. We first 
summarise the main findings from our analysis, 
and then provide four recommendations on how 
the programme can improve its impacts on the 
environment and on people. 
7.1 a summary of the main 
messages 
Here we summarise the main discussions 
presented in this report, focusing on three 
areas: 1) the governance in which the PES 
operates; 2) the outcomes for the environment; 
and 3) access to the programme and outcomes 
for people.
7.1.1 Changing programme governance
•	 Twenty years have passed since the idea for 
PES originated, following the Rio Conference 
in 1992. The environmental, economic and 
political context has changed, and with it the 
demands on the programme’s design.
•	 Set up as an experiment, the PES programme 
has become rooted in the country’s 
conservation policy. Heavily reliant on public 
funding – and as such prone to political 
upheavals – it has nevertheless ‘survived’ 
several changes in government, supported 
strongly by landowners, the conservation 
movement in civil society, and the population at 
large. 
•	 The PES programme complements regulatory 
instruments for conservation, like PAs and 
prohibitions to change forest cover. While 
structural shifts in the economy in the 80s–90s 
can certainly be thanked for part of the forest 
recovery37, it is uncertain how strong the forest 
recovery trend would have been without the 
payments combined with the ban on landuse 
change compliance with the law. 
•	 Although still heavily reliant on public funds, the 
programme has an active approach to engaging 
with the private sector and seeking funds 
through voluntary carbon markets at national 
and international level. 
•	 FONAFIFO has managed to maintain a level 
of continuity and autonomy since it took over 
management of PES, which has allowed it to 
experiment with different types of selection 
criteria and contract conditions, allowing the 
design of PES to shift to meet new economic 
realities, social and environmental priorities. 
Stability of key staff and an independent 
board representing the main conservation and 
economic interests in forests, are important 
ingredients of sustainable governance of PES. 
•	 The design of PES, although heavily influenced 
by the conditionality of large funding agencies 
such as the World Bank Ecomarkets projects, 
has since its inception been a ‘home-grown’ 
policy instrument developed by Costa Rican 
professionals and academics.
7.1.2 The programme’s impacts on the 
environment
•	 Since the first payments to private landowners 
were made in 1997 the programme has 
contributed to the conservation of nearly 1 
million hectares of forest under protection 
(90 per cent – some of them already under 
renewed contracts), reforestation (6 per cent), 
sustainable management (3 per cent) and more 
recently regeneration (1 per cent). 
SEVEN
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37. The Spanish version of this report has a detailed historical background to the PES programme. It can be found at 
http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/16514SIIED.pdf.
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•	 Initial settings for contract allocation were 
ineffective, leading to payments going to 
areas with low risk of deforestation and of 
low conservation value. Targeting has since 
improved using, amongst others, conservation 
gaps identified by a national-level conservation 
strategy (known as GRUAS II). The PES 
programme in complements protected areas in 
the productive landscape. The PES programme 
will face increasing opportunity costs and 
challenges to environmental effectiveness as 
it is expanded to non-forested areas to meet 
national ‘carbon zero’ and REDD+ targets. 
•	 The PES programme will face increasing 
opportunity costs and challenges to 
environmental effectiveness as it is expanded 
to non-forested areas to meet national ‘carbon 
zero’ and REDD+ targets. 
•	 The programme is structured around four 
specific ecosystem services: water protection, 
carbon sequestration, biodiversity conservation 
and scenic value. While there has been 
much effort to target the programme towards 
conservation priorities, little work has been 
done to prove the impacts of the programme, 
its targeting, or funding mechanisms to 
ensure delivery of the four services. Hardly 
any evidence – in the form of specific metrics 
like number of species, or impacts on key 
species – has been gathered to show that 
these services (with the potential exception of 
carbon sequestration) have increased due to 
the effects of the programme, and obtaining this 
evidence could be very expensive. However, 
the Costa Rican PES programme is not the only 
programme of its type that is not measuring 
changes in ecosystem levels. Like most 
environmental programmes around the world, 
the Costa Rican PES focuses on relatively 
easy-to-measure indicators, like hectares 
of land, rather than assessing one type of 
ecosystem service.
7.1.3 Access and impacts on the people
•	 Impact evaluations have consistently shown 
that landowners’ characteristics (such as 
educational level) strongly influence the 
programme’s environmental outcomes. 
This is just as important a factor as aspects 
of the programme’s design, such as 
environmental targeting.
•	 People can benefit from the PES programme 
directly and indirectly. There are direct financial 
benefits from receiving payments; indirect 
impacts include job creation by PES and 
significantly better provision of ecosystem 
services. This ensures greater resilience to 
climate change, and inputs to production, 
for example to agriculture, generation of 
hydroelectricity, and the ecotourism industry. 
Most efforts at accounting for the programme’s 
impacts focus on the direct payments. There 
is little evaluation so far in terms of how PES 
affects water, carbon, biodiversity (or wildlife), 
or scenic value; and how this in turn affects 
people. 
•	 Because of the large tracts of land they manage, 
indigenous communities stand to play an 
increasingly important role in the programme, 
although the additionality from these lands is 
low because of their low risk of deforestation. 
By directly targeting indigenous communities 
participation has significantly increased, from 
3 per cent of budget allocation in 1997 to 26 
per cent in 2012. These social impacts are very 
important, as PES is one of the few sources of 
cash in these communities. 
•	 A positive impact of the programme is the 
increasing participation of female-headed 
properties. Considering individual-signed 
contracts alone (not associations or 
companies) the proportion of women-headed 
properties has increased from 16 per cent 
in 1997 to 23 per cent in 2012 (and as high 
as 30 per cent in 2008). This is despite 
the fact that the programme does not give 
priority on the basis of gender, and that land is 
traditionally registered under male ownership. 
Two hypotheses are worth checking: that 
land is increasingly registered under women’s 
ownership; and that women who own land with 
forest increasingly find the PES programme an 
attractive economic activity.
•	 There is some indication that PES has promoted 
gradually regularising tenure among smaller 
landowners, rather than tenure regularisation 
being a precondition for implementing PES. 
This has taken place through a combination 
of eligibility requirements and expected 
payments being used to obtain informal 
credit to pay for tenure documentation. Other 
cross-compliance benefits may include PES’s 
requirements to comply with farm employees’ 
social security obligations. This deserves further 
empirical study.
•	 A critique of the PES programme has been 
its bias towards relatively large properties. 
However, the introduction of agroforestry 
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contracts has been a successful way to 
engage with smaller properties. For example, 
in 1997 only 15 properties of less than 10 
hectares participated in PES. By 2012 the 
number was 276, the majority of them under 
agroforestry contracts.
•	 The SDI has not provided an effective criterion 
to prioritise access to low-income areas, as it 
gives indiscriminate priority to relatively large 
(and wealthy) properties located in these areas. 
Although it can be argued that some of these 
resources are re-invested locally, the direct 
beneficiaries of the priority policy are not always 
captured by the more vulnerable. 
•	 Participation in PES is increasingly dominated 
by legal entities, which took 25 per cent of 
funding in 1997 and nearly 50 per cent in 2012. 
This is in part due to patterns of land ownership, 
with landowners favouring company status 
for tax purposes. These legal entities are on 
average larger than properties with individual 
ownership. One hypothesis is that increasing 
participation of legal entities is happening at 
the expense of smaller, individually owned (and 
potentially less wealthy) landowners. A more 
worrying aspect of legal entities is the difficulty 
of tracking social impacts, because of the 
anonymity conferred by their legal status. The 
PES programme is accountable by law for its 
social impact, and as an institution FONAFIFO 
must be able to explain transparently how 
payments are distributed, who benefits and 
who loses.
7.2 recommendations
As the PES scheme enters a more mature phase 
it can no longer afford to ‘learn by doing’ and is 
adopting more advanced tools and mechanisms 
that reflect this institutional maturity and its 
significant accumulated technical expertise at 
national and local level. The success of the PES 
programme has put it on the international radar, 
and as such, more is expected from it. Internally, 
the approach to user-oriented sources of funding 
requires better tools to ensure the provision 
of the desired ecosystem services, while the 
dependence on public funding demands the 
delivery of socially acceptable outcomes. 
Our analysis has pointed to four main areas where 
PES can improve its current approach: by using 
simple indicators for environmental impact; by 
targeting a specific social group; by considering 
approaches to increase cost-effectiveness; 
and by defining an impact evaluation tool for 
continuous monitoring that avoids duplication. 
7.2.1 Keep indicators simple through careful 
planning 
Simple can be best, especially in PES. The 
programme uses land as a unit to account 
for ‘bundled’ ecosystem services (an input-
based approach) rather than accounting for its 
components, such as particular species or units 
of carbon captured (an output-based approach). 
This emphasises that a healthy ecosystem is more 
likely to deliver ecosystem services. The current 
landscape approach targets geographical areas 
on the basis of their risk of conversion, ‘hotspots’ 
and interconnecting biological corridors. 
This approach should result in the delivery of 
ecosystem services being more likely, rather 
than spending large proportions of the budget in 
monitoring separate impacts in detail. However, 
the programme must identify which ecosystem 
services it wishes to support, and ensure that 
the payments support the desired landscape 
composition needed to provide these services. 
Not doing so risks programme expenditures failing 
to deliver the desired national and social benefits.
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7.2.2 Re-define the social filter
The use of the SDI as a priority criterion is limited, 
and confers equal priority of access on small- or 
large-scale landowners located in these areas. 
Priority only by property size is equally limited, 
as it does not reflect landowners’ relative wealth 
and opportunity costs. A proposed indicator to 
assign social priority in non-indigenous territories 
could be: properties belonging to individuals 
(rather than companies or associations); located 
in areas with a low SDI; and with small properties 
(less than 50 hectares) – see Figure 15. Even 
better than using the SDI would be a composite 
wealth indicator that includes land values. Rather 
than making differentiated payments following 
this social criterion, the proposed indicator could 
be used for 1) assigning priority for contract 
allocation; and 2) measuring social impacts in 
terms of equity of access and distribution. 
Much of this information can already be obtained 
through the application forms. Studying what 
drives the increasing participation of private 
companies in the programme will be useful to 
understand whether this is a normal result of 
the way land is registered in Costa Rica, or if 
participation of these companies takes place 
at the expense of more vulnerable farmers. 
Periodic assessments of the PES programme are 
needed to guarantee legitimacy as perceived by 
participants, civil society, donors and purchasers 
of ecosystem services. 
7.2.3 Consider differentiated payment levels 
to increase cost-effectiveness
The programme already uses differentiated 
payments to some degree – rewarding, for 
example, the use of native species or the 
conservation of old-growth forest. Payments 
levels, however, do not take into account the 
opportunity costs of participants, potentially 
resulting in high levels of surplus for those who 
participate and a large number of rejected 
applications. Lowering payments can lead to 
participation of more landowners, or freeing up 
resources to increase payments where higher 
incentives are required to motivate a change. 
A better understanding is needed of economic 
context, local regulations regarding land use, 
the profitability of alternative land uses, and their 
capacity to provide the ecosystem services of 
interest; this can help tune payment levels to 
local costs. It is important to take into account 
economies of scale that could exclude small 
properties, and how heterogeneous conditions 
might affect equity in a more market-based 
approach (like auctions) to elicit the demand 
curve and/or to determine contract allocation. A 
mix of instruments may be necessary to achieve 
the potentially conflicting objectives of efficiency 
and fairness. 
7.2.4 Data gathering for continuous 
programme evaluation 
Periodic programme evaluation is needed but 
costly. Obtaining and maintaining the appropriate 
control groups is extremely difficult, especially 
with respect to the legal status of participants. 
Compiling biophysical, economic and social 
data for both the intervention and control groups 
involves additional costs, both for landowners 
and for FONAFIFO. The creation of a periodic 
evaluation tool must be an integral part of the 
institution’s normal monitoring system, to avoid 
duplication in data collection and monitoring. 
For example, an information system should link 
information from the different steps of the pre-
application and application process to awarded 
contracts, payment information, monitoring data, 
and contract renewal information. This integration 
of databases can then be taken advantage of for 
periodic strategic programme evaluation (see 
Figure 16). 
figure 15. ProPosed combined 
indicator for sociaL Priority 
Source: Authors’ own. 
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Source: Authors’ own. 
the programme that guarantees the provision 
of ecosystem services. This implies a greater 
application of technical and scientific knowledge 
that maximises the possibilities of effective 
provision of ecosystem services. By providing 
better ecosystem services, all of society – rich 
and poor – will benefit, directly and indirectly. 
But the social objectives of the scheme must 
be accurately targeted, and renewed efforts 
are needed to guarantee that the scheme is 
accessible for those who can and who wish to 
participate. 
All of these suggestions may help increase 
the programme’s impacts, but will also result 
– especially in the short- and medium-term – 
in higher programme implementation costs. 
Evaluation will also be required to gauge the 
potential benefits versus costs of increased 
spatial planning and targeting. A careful 
consideration of the distribution of benefits and 
costs, access and rejection, will be needed 
as well.
The success of PES in Costa Rica is ultimately 
linked to the governance and governability of 
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Costa Rica’s Payments for Ecosystems 
Services (PES) programme has become 
something of an icon in the world of PES. Its 
hitches and successes provide a valuable 
source of information and inspiration for other 
countries interested in exploring ‘policymixes’ of 
economic and regulatory instruments to promote 
ecosystems conservation and regeneration. 
In this paper we explore how the governance 
of the PES programme has evolved over time, 
how the context in which it sits has changed, 
and how it prepares to face future challenges by 
incorporating new tools and strengthening its 
alliances with other institutions. We discuss the 
policies used by the programme to affect the way 
forests are managed and the reported outcomes 
on the ecosystem services they are expected to 
provide. Since PES is for society as much as the 
environment, we also look in detail at the impacts 
on those directly receiving PES, and what 
policies and personal characteristics may affect 
how PES funding seeps into rural economies. 
Also published in Spanish, this paper is aimed at 
local practitioners, international researchers and 
donors interested in the Costa Rican experience 
and the lessons that emerge from it.
The success of the PES scheme in Costa Rica 
ultimately depends on its ability to guarantee the 
provision and protection of ecosystem services. 
This requires a greater application of technical 
and scientific knowledge, while balancing on 
the tightrope of a limited budget. A healthier 
ecosystem will benefit all of society; rich and 
poor, directly and indirectly. But the social and 
environmental objectives of the scheme must 
be targeted accurately, and renewed efforts 
are needed to guarantee that the programme 
delivers. 
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